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I. INTRODUCTION
The Friday before Christmas week of 1984 the bankruptcy judge presiding over
the Chapter 11 reorganization' involving Ellingsen MacLean Oil Company faced a
dilemma. 2 Ellingsen, a supplier of home heating oil in Michigan, had no money to
buy heating oil to supply to its residential customers for Christmas. If it failed to
provide that oil its business probably would collapse. Yet, Ellingsen's lender would
extend further credit only if the court preferred the lender's prepetition unsecured
claim 3 over all other unsecured claims and immunized its secured claim4 from an
existing fraudulent conveyance attack. Not surprisingly, the unsecured creditors who
learned of this proposal opposed giving such concessions to the lender, because those
concessions potentially took millions of dollars away from them. Furthermore, only
a few of the creditors had even received notice of the lender's proposal, even though
Ellingsen had been in Chapter 11 for nine months. Faced with this emergency,
however, the bankruptcy court, like most,5 capitulated to the lender and granted the
"lender preference clauses." 6 The creditors who knew of this order immediately
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) are the generally applicable provisions of "Chapter 11,"
the single reorganization chapter of the current federal bankruptcy law, promulgated in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), and amended in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Titles I and III, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), and in the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986). This law is known
as and will be referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code."
2. The facts are discussed in the district court and Sixth Circuit opinions in Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust (In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co.), 65 Bankr. 358, 359-60 (W.D. Mich. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 599,
600-01 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 55 (1988).
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(4), 506(a) (1982) for definitions of "claim" and "unsecured claim," respectively.
4. See id. § 506(a) for definition of "secured claim."
5. For a discussion of the reluctant trend toward granting preferences to bankruptcy lenders, see Tabb, A Critical
Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAtuF. L. Rv. 109, 116-19 (1986). In that article, I argued
that cross-collateralization clauses, a form of "lender preference clause," see infra note 6, should not be allowed under
any circumstances. See Tabb, supra, at 110.
6. "Lender preference clauses," a term I have coined to describe the general type of clause which prefers the
lender's prepetition claims over those of other similarly situated creditors, may come in a variety of forms. The best
known clause is "cross-collateralization," pursuant to which postpetition assets of the bankruptcy estate are used to
secure the prepetition unsecured portion of the lender's claim. Many courts have approved these clauses. See, e.g., In re
Beker Indus., 58 Bankr. 725, 741-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833, 837, 840 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Roblin Indus., 52 Bankr. 241, 244-45 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Vanguard Diversified,
Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re General Oil Distrib., 20 Bankr. 873, 876 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982); MeCain Foods, Inc. v. Flagstaff Foodservice Co. (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 14 Bankr. 462, 468-69
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Borne Chem. Co. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp. (In re Borne Chem. Co.), 9 Bankr. 263,
269 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981). Others have not. See Otte v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.),
596 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (2d Cir. 1979);In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). Texlon
is discussed in Tabb, supra note 5, at 113-16, with regard to its discussion of the merits of cross-collateralization and in
Part IV of this Article with regard to its discussion of the finality issue. Another clause is "cross-superprioritization," in
which the lender's prepetition unsecured claim is given priority over all other claims in the bankruptcy case. See, e.g.,
FCX, 54 Bankr. at 841 (court in dictum stated it might not approve such a clause, but construed loan agreement as not
providing for such a priority); Roblin, 52 Bankr. at 244; Vanguard, 31 Bankr. at 366; General Oil, 20 Bankr. at 874-75;
Borne Chem., 9 Bankr. at 266, 268, 270. Sometimes outright payment of the prepetition claims is called for, although
this practice is extremely disfavored by the courts. See B & W Enter. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B & W Enter.), 713
F.2d 534, 535-37 (9th Cir. 1983).
A final type of clause does not in a technical sense prefer the lender's prepetition claim; instead, the clause effects
a waiver of objections to the validity of prepetition collateral positions. This was the clause that most disturbed the
unsecured creditors and the dissent in In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 607 (6th Cir. 1987) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting). See also FCX, 54 Bankr. at 837, 841-42; Roblin, 52 Bankr. at 243-44 (court that approved cross-
collateralization refused to approve such a waiver clause); Flagstaff, 16 Bankr. at 134-35; Borne, 9 Bankr. at 266.
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appealed, but the appeal could not be heard before the lender advanced the money to
meet the emergency. The appellate court held that the creditors' appeals were moot
under Bankruptcy Code section 364(e). 7 The lender had won. Not only had it
manipulated an emergency to extract highly controversial benefits, but it also had
insulated those benefits from appellate review. When one considers the very forceful
legal objections that can be made to such preferential arrangements, 8 this was truly
a startling and troubling result. Unfortunately, it was not unusual, as will be discussed
below. 9
In another reorganization case, involving Texlon Corporation,10 the debtor's
lender similarly had extracted lender preference clauses, this time in an ex parte
financing order entered without notice on the day the petition was filed. This
financing order never was appealed. Several months later, after substantial further
loans were made by the lender pursuant to the financing order, the case was converted
to a straight liquidation bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee then asked the bank-
ruptcy court to modify its earlier order to take away the lender's preferences. The
bankruptcy judge, although sympathetic with the trustee's arguments against the
propriety of granting such preferential benefits in the first place, felt constrained by
notions of finality and refused to alter his final order.II On appeal, the Second Circuit
surprisingly held that the finality of the order did not preclude its modification by the
bankruptcy judge, as long as no rights of the lender had vested in reliance on the
order.' 2 In that case, the lender lost, despite the apparent finality of the order.
These leading cases graphically highlight, in the financing order context, how
courts are misapplying principles of appealability' 3 and finality14 in Chapter 11
reorganization cases. These errors stem in part from confusion generated by the
unusual procedural nature of a Chapter 11 reorganization case,' 5 in part from the
7. In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 65 Bankr. 358, 364-65 (W.D. Mich. 1986). The text of § 364(e) is set forth
infra text accompanying note 47. Section 364(e) protects a good faith § 364 lender against an appellate modification or
reversal of the authorizing financing order if no stay of the order was obtained. See infra subparts IlI.A. and III.C.
8. These arguments, discussed in detail in Tabb, supra note 5, at 119-74, are: (1) the Bankruptcy Code's principle
of equality of distribution to similarly situated creditors (here, unsecured creditors) is being violated; (2) the inducement
rationale supporting postpetition priorities does not apply; and (3) § 364 states the exclusive list for permissible
postpetition financing incentives.
9. See infra subpart nlI.A., and particularly the cases discussed infra note 44.
10. In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (2d Cir. 1979).
11. In re Texlon Corp., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1013, 1016-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 596 F.2d 1092
(2d Cir. 1979).
12. Texlon, 596 F.2d at 1099-1101. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the finality issue.
13. Most of the discussion in the cases with regard to appealability has focused on the mootness issue, particularly
under 11 U.S.C. § 364(e), discussed infra subparts III.A. and lII.C. The broader term "appealability" is used here
because some appellate courts have also stated that appellants may be estopped to prosecute the appeal. Estoppel is
discussed infra subpart UIL.B.2.
14. "Finality" in this Article refers to the policy of repose applicable to noninterlocutory orders that have not been
appealed in the time indicated by applicable procedural rules. This Article does not examine the difficult question of what
bankruptcy orders are sufficiently "final" to be appealed. See, e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Looney (In re Looney), 823
F.2d 788, 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 488 (1987); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1009 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986). Unless expressly stated to be interlocutory by the bankruptcy judge, see, e.g.,
In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833, 839 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985), financing orders are considered "final" in the sense that
they may be appealed.
15. The "case," not separately defined in the Code (although identified by inference in many statutory provisions,
see, e.g., 11 IU.S.C. § 101(12) (1982), defining "debtor" as the "person or municipality concerning which a case under
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tendency of bankruptcy courts to try to save a reorganization at all Costs, 16 despite the
fact that most reorganizations fail, 17 and in part from the dynamics of the
reorganization case. 18 The failure of courts to apply properly these principles of
appealability and finality poses serious concerns for the bankruptcy system. Reor-
ganizations are threatened. Substantive rights may be gained or lost because of this
procedural dysfunction. Using bankruptcy financing orders as a context, this Article
explores these problems of appealability and finality and suggests appropriate
resolutions that will facilitate reorganizations, treat all parties fairly, and further the
policies of the Bankruptcy Code.
The interests of the debtor, the debtor's lender, and the unsecured creditors often
diverge. 19 As seen in Ellingsen and TexIon, and as will be explained in Part II, the
this title has been commenced" (emphasis added)), is the overall judicial action concerning the debtor. It may last several
years in large, complex cases such as Manville. The "case" is comprised of many separate "proceedings," which are
the multitude of separate matters undertaken during the case. An analogy may be drawn to the administration of a
decedent's estate. Some but not all of the proceedings in a case are adversarial. For example, a suit by the trustee to
recover money is an "adversary proceeding," FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1), and is almost identical to a traditional civil
lawsuit. Other matters not classified as "adversary proceedings" still may be contested, and are referred to as "contested
matters." Id. R. 9014. A motion by a creditor for relief from the automatic stay of It U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) is an example. Many of the procedural rules governing civil lawsuits apply to contested matters. Finally, many
administrative matters, such as the appointment of a trustee, may not be contested at all. Many of these administrative
functions have been delegated to the United States trustee in the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986). See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying
text. A further complication in attempting to make sense of the procedural morass of a Chapter 11 case is that the notice
given of the various proceedings in a case varies widely and sometimes is dispensed with entirely. See infra Part V for
further discussion.
16. In Ellingsen, for example, the creditors believed that the Chapter 11 case was doomed to failure and that the
bankruptcy judge was just prolonging the agony at their expense. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5-6 n.4,
Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust (In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co.), 56 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S.
Apr. 14, 1988) (No. 87-1718), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 55 (1988).
17. See United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808
F.2d 363, 382 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988) (over 90% of Chapter 11
cases filed in the last five years have failed).
18. See infra Part II; see also Tabb, supra note 5, at 111, 163-67.
19. The debtor, having just filed a Chapter 11 petition, typically is not in a strong bargaining position to obtain
postpetition financing, and thus in most cases is willing to accede to whatever demands the lender makes. See In re Texlon
Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1098 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The debtor in possession is hardly neutral. Its interest in its own survival,
even at the expense of equal treatment of creditors, and close relations with a lending institution tend to prevent the
exploration of other available courses."). See Tabb, supra note 5, at 165-66; Comment, Initial Financing Restrictions
in Chapter XI Bankruptcy Proceedings, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1683, 1685 n.26 (1978) [hereinafter Initial Financing
Restrictions]. The acquiescent debtor effectively is binding the unsecured creditors by agreeing to the financing, especially
if the mootness holdings discussed in subpart III.A. below are followed. This problem of a consenting party giving away
the rights of others is also prevalent in the area of consent decrees. See generally Laycock, Consent Decrees Without
Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Cm. LEois. FORUM 103. The debtor's lender usually is most
interested in maximizing its return on its prepetition claim. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 111, 144; Initial Financing
Restrictions, supra, at 1694. This often means keeping the debtor afloat long enough to realize higher going concern
values on its prepetition collateral, instead of lower liquidation values. If the lender has a significant prepetition unsecured
claim, the lender may try to enhance its position vis-A-vis other unsecured creditors by means of lender preference clauses.
The unsecured creditors want the reorganization to succeed so that the dividend on their unsecured claims will be
increased. Financing made without lender preference clauses typically would meet with their approval, since the new
money is of course crucial to the success of the debtor's business rehabilitation. Even in that instance, however, if the
debtor were liquidated immediately, unsecured creditors who would receive a significant dividend might be hesitant about
continuing a questionable Chapter 11 case, because their dividend might be eroded by the accrual of administrative
expenses during the pendency of the case. If the Chapter 11 financing is made on a preferential basis, the likelihood of
opposition by the unsecured creditors increases dramatically, since the direct effect of the preferences is to pay the lender
before the general body of unsecured creditors. The more indirect and distant hope of an ultimately increased dividend
that might result from a successful reorganization now theoretically made possible by the new loan often is insufficient
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debtor's lender has been able to use its willingness to extend further financing
essential to the reorganization as a lever to obtain preferred treatment for its
prepetition claims. This practice is highly controversial, 20 and the validity of granting
such preferences is very much open to question. To complicate matters further, the
financing order containing these lender preference clauses typically is entered on an
emergency basis with little or no notice to the very creditors whose interests
potentially are being prejudiced.2 1 Yet bankruptcy judges, presented with an
emergency threatening the reorganization, often feel they have little choice but to
acquiesce.
The affected unsecured creditors have attacked the prejudicial lender preference
clauses in the financing order either by appealing, as in Ellingsen,22 or by asking the
bankruptcy court to reconsider its order, as in Texlon. 23 Although most of the
attention in the debate over the validity of lender preference clauses has focused on
substantive issues, 24 cases such as Ellingsen and Texlon indicate that procedural
issues of mootness, estoppel, and finality instead have been determinative. Unfor-
tunately, the courts have gotten the results exactly wrong. In the case of appeals,
courts protect the lender when they should not; in the case of motions to reconsider,
courts do not protect the lender when they should.
Where the objecting creditors appeal, the lender's preferences have been
protected by the courts' improper interpretation of the mootness provisions of
Bankruptcy Code section 364(e).2 5 As set forth in Part Im, neither section 364(e) nor
general principles of mootness or estoppel should prevent the appellate court from
reviewing the lender preference clauses. The lender preference clauses are severable
from the rest of the financing order. Promoting appellate review would further the
development of the substantive law as to the validity of lender preference clauses.
The bankruptcy lender still would have the certainty of knowing within the time for
filing an appeal26 whether the lender preference clauses were being contested.
Part IV addresses the propriety of the bankruptcy court itself modifying or
vacating its earlier order pursuant to a motion filed after the time for filing an appeal
to assuage the unsecured creditors' concerns about the preferences granted to the lender. Ellingsen is a typical example
of this unsecured creditor opposition.
20. See cases cited supra note 6. Compare Tabb, supra note 5, at 110 (should not be allowed) andInitial Financing
Restrictions, supra note 19, at 1693-95 (should not be allowed), with Bohm, The Legal Justification for the Proper Use
of Cross-Collateralization Clauses in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 59 Ami. BANKR. L.J. 289, 296-97 (1985) (should be
allowed); Weintraub & Resnick, Cross-Collateralization of Prepetition Indebtedness as an Inducement for Postpetition
Financing:A Euphemism Comes ofAge, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 86, 89-90 (1981) (should be allowed), and Ordin, In re Texon
Corporation: Finality of Order of Bankruptcy Court, 54 Am. BANKR. L.J. 173, 177-78 (1980) (should be allowed).
21. The lender preference cases almost always involve abbreviated notice, with the financing order entered at or
near the commencement of the case. See, e.g., Butler Paper Co. v. Graphic Arts Lithographers (In re Graphic Arts
Lithographers), 71 Bankr. 774, 775-76 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (three hours notice, entered day after case filed); In re
Texlon, 596 F.2d at 1094 (no notice, entered day case filed). See also M. Bms-Nocc, BANKRPrcy REORGANA N 225
(1987); Initial Financing Restrictions, supra note 19, at 1699. This topic is explored in depth in Part V.
22. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text and infra subpart III.A.
23. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text and infra subpart IV.A.
24. See cases and articles cited supra note 20.
25. See infra text accompanying note 47 and subpart III.A.
26. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002 specifies the time for filing an appeal. The standard period is 10 days after the date
of entry of the judgment, id. R. 8002(a), although the period may be extended for up to another 20 days. Id. R. 8002(c).
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has expired. Traditional concepts of finality suggest that such an attack should be
rejected except in very limited circumstances. Surprisingly, however, a few promi-
nent cases, such as Texlon, 27 relax the normal requirements on the basis of a dated
vision of bankruptcy proceedings. Those courts state that bankruptcy orders may be
modified freely as long as no intervening rights have vested in reliance on the order.28
This Article concludes that bankruptcy courts should limit relief to situations
encompassed within rule 60(b)2 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the
financing order context, relief would be granted only when there has been insufficient
notice30 or some fraud by the lender. 31
Part V of this Article analyzes the notice problem separately, because notice
issues are important both in appellate attacks and in motions to the bankruptcy court
for relief. Although the courts typically are lenient to the lender and allow minimal
notice,32 considerable confusion exists, and inconsistent results are reached, given
the exigent circumstances under which financing orders are usually entered.33 Part V
recommends a framework for resolving notice issues in bankruptcy generally and in
financing cases specifically. This framework would provide sufficient protection for
all parties involved and would enhance certainty as to the sufficiency of the notice
given. At the same time, application of this framework by the courts would take away
some of the unfair protection enjoyed by lenders in many recent cases.
II. THE SETTING IN WHICH LENDER PREFERENCE CLAusEs ARE GRANTED
A Chapter 11 debtor usually has an urgent need for new money to keep its
business operating. 34 The debtor's prebankruptcy lender in many cases is able to take
advantage of this need and its own willingness to extend the new money to extract
lender preference clauses. Lender preference clauses prefer the prepetition claims of
the debtor's lender over all unsecured claims. 35 Typically, the lender's unsecured
claims are given priority. Another type of clause makes the lender's secured claims
immune from avoidance. For example, assume that prior to bankruptcy the debtor's
lender had a total claim of five million dollars, with collateral securing the loan
valued at only four million dollars. For bankruptcy purposes, the lender would have
a secured claim of four million dollars and an unsecured claim of one million
27. See supra notes 10-12 and infra notes 177-210 and accompanying text.
28. See infra subpart W.A.
29. See infra note 176 for the applicable provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), specifying the grounds for relief from
a final judgment. FED. R. BAsNKR. P 9024 incorporates rule 60(b) into bankruptcy practice.
30. See infra notes 172 and 258-62 and accompanying text and subpart V.D.
31. See infra notes 164-71 and 251-57 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., In re Graphic Arts Lithographers, 71 Bankr. 774, 775-76 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (three hours notice
sufficient).
33. See, e.g., In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350, 355 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980); J.ANDEsON, CHAPrER 11
REORGANIZArONS § 9.12, at 9-45 (1984). Most of the contested lender preference cases involve extremely short notice.
See cases cited infra note 318.
34. See In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 1987); Burchinal v. Central Washington
Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1987); In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833, 835 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1985); M. BimENEsrocK, supra note 21, at 225; Tabb, supra note 5, at 111.
35. See supra note 6 for a more detailed discussion of the types of lender preference clauses.
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dollars. 36 A lender preference clause might require the lender's one million dollar
prepetition unsecured claim to be paid prior to all other unsecured claims, or it might
bar any scrutiny of the validity of the four million dollar secured claim. These results
violate established bankruptcy policies. 37 Accordingly, it seems odd that the
bankruptcy court would approve a lender preference clause. The more sensible route
seemingly would be for the debtor in possession to borrow from another lender who
does not make such extortionate demands. 38
The problem is that the debtor in possession in many cases does not have the
freedom to borrow from another lender, but instead is "locked in" to its prebank-
ruptcy lender. 39 Thus does the old lender use its willingness to extend new money to
coerce the bankruptcy court into granting preferential treatment for its prepetition
claim.
The "lock in" effect occurs for several reasons. The first is time. The debtor
often needs the money immediately and does not have time to find a new lender. 40
Second, the prebankruptcy lender may insist on being the bankruptcy lender so that
it can enhance its position. 41 The lender may threaten to take a hostile approach in the
bankruptcy case if it is not allowed to be the bankruptcy lender on preferential
terms. 42 Finally, the old lender may be the only lender willing to extend new money
to the debtor. That lender has a vested interest in seeing the reorganization succeed
so that it can realize more on its prepetition secured and unsecured claims. 43 Other
potential lenders who do not have prepetition claims against the debtor lack the same
incentive. Thus, the dynamics of reorganization financing are such that the debtor's
prebankruptcy lender is able to obtain lender preference clauses in a significant
number of cases.
36. See II U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
37. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38. As pointed out in Tabb, supra note 5, at 113, unsecured creditors are not prejudiced if the financing is done
by a new lender who does not have a prepetition unsecured claim to prefer.
39. See id. at 164-65 for a discussion of the "lock in" effect.
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. In In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987), the debtor before filing Chapter 11 had
negotiated possible borrowing arrangements with willing new lenders. The prebankruptcy lender, however, apparently
insisted on being the bankruptcy lender and "required the debtors to file Chapter I1 proceedings to clarify [the bank's]
rights." Id. This certainly represents a novel use of Chapter 11, which most people previously had thought existed for
the benefit of debtors, not lenders.
The converse of the situation under consideration is not true. The prebankruptcy lender cannot be compelled to loan
money to the debtor in possession. Any prepetition commitment to lend cannot be enforced in bankruptcy against the
lender. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1982).
42. For example, the lender may threaten to move for relief from the automatic stay under I 1 U.S.C. § 362 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986); may oppose the use of cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 363; may demand adequate protection under
11 U.S.C. § 361; and, most damaging of all, may vote against the proposed plan of reorganization, requiring the debtor
to attempt to invoke the "cram down" powers of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) to confirm the plan over the lender's dissent. As
a practical matter it is extremely difficult for a debtor to successfully reorganize in the face of opposition from its major
secured creditor.
43. See supra note 19. Thus, in a sense, the "lock in" effect works both ways.
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I[I. DESTROYING APPEALABILITY: MOOTNESS AND ESTOPPEL AS A CATCH-22 FOR THE
VICTIMIZED CREDITOR
The most significant recent development regarding the issues of the finality and
appealability of financing orders containing lender preference clauses has been in
those cases, beginning with Ellingsen,44 holding the appeal of the entire financing
order moot under Bankruptcy Code section 364(e). 45 These holdings have insulated
lender preference clauses from appellate scrutiny. This Part will explain why those
cases are wrong and why substantive appellate review of the validity of lender
preference clauses is proper, even though the lender has advanced new money.
44. This line of cases began in 1986 with the district court decision in In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 65 Bankr.
358 (W.D. Mich. 1986), which is discussed infra this note. That decision was followed in In re Graphic Arts
Lithographics, 71 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987). In Graphic Arts the financing order, which contained a
cross-collateralization clause, was entered ex parte on three hours telephonic notice the day after the Chapter II petition
was filed. Four creditors of the debtor appealed, but since no stay of the financing order was obtained, the lender's
§ 364(e) motion to dismiss for mootness was granted. Id. at 775-76. The appellate court assumed without discussion that
§ 364(e) applied to the cross-collateralization clause and determined that the lender had not acted in bad faith, since the
funds were advanced for a proper purpose, to allow the debtor to operate postpetition, and since the lender did not know
that cross-collateralization was illegal, but only that it was a disputed concept. Id. at 776-77. The court erroneously
concluded that its mootness holding made it unnecessary to consider the notice question. Id.
The next important case was In re Adams Apple, 829 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1987). Although several major unsecured
creditors objected to the cross-collateralization clause, the bankruptcy court approved the financing arrangement
tentatively the day after the cases were filed, and funds were advanced. Final authorization later was given. One unsecured
creditor immediately filed a motion requesting a stay pending appeal, but the bankruptcy court denied that motion, as well
as a motion to reconsider its order. Id. at 1486. Thus, the objecting creditors could have done nothing more to stop the
implementation of the order. After the district court affirmed the financing order on the merits, id. at 1486-87, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot under § 364(e). Id. at 1487-91. The court first held that § 364(e) applied to
cross-collateralization clauses. Id. at 1488-89. The court's analysis of the applicability issue is considered in detail infra
subpart III.A. Having decided that § 364(e) applied to cross-collateralization clauses, the Ninth Circuit had no trouble
finding that the lender had acted in good faith, following the reasoning of the district court in Ellingsen and the bankruptcy
appellate panel in Graphic Arts. Id. at 1489-91.
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit decision in Adans Apple, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding of
mootness in In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1987). Many of the pertinent facts in Ellingsen axe
discussed at the beginning of this Article. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. After entry of a financing order
containing several lender preference clauses on one day telephonic notice to a few creditors, the creditors' committee and
an individual large creditor appealed to the district court, but did not obtain a stay of the order. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at
600-01; Ellingsen, 65 Bankr. at 360, 362-63. The district court granted the lenders' motion to dismiss the appeal as moot
under § 364(e). Ellingsen, 65 Bankr. at 363-65. The court first held that sufficient notice was given and rejected the
allegation that the debtors and the banks had contrived the emergency. Id. at 361-63. The court next held that the lenders
had acted in good faith, for the reasons outlined above in the discussion of Graphic Arts. Id. at 363-65.
A sharply divided Sixth Circuit affined the district court's decision to dismiss the appeal as moot under § 364(e).
Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605. Judge Wellford for the majority largely followed the district court's analysis, holding first that
§ 364(e) applied to lender preference clauses. Id. at 601-05. He then held that the lenders had acted in good faith. Id.
at 605.
Judge Nelson concurred "to emphasize the limited precedential effect of our holding." Id. at 605-06 (Nelson, J.,
concurring). Unlike the majority, id. at 602-04, Judge Nelson expressed reservations about the substantive validity of
cross-collateralization, but concurred based on an estoppel theory. According to Judge Nelson, the appellants were on
notice that the order itself stated that the § 364(e) safe harbor provision would apply; the banks relied on this statement;
and the appellants' failure to get the order stayed estopped them. Id. at 606. See infra note 100 and subpart III.B.2. for
further discussion of the estoppel argument.
Judge Merritt in a short dissent vehemently disagreed with the court's holding. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 607 (Merritt,
J., dissenting). He objected particularly to the clause waiving all objections to the prepetition liens of the banks and would
have reversed and permitted the pursuit of the fraudulent conveyance claim. Id. He concluded that § 364(e) does not apply
at all to lender preference clauses, which deal only with prepetition matters, but instead would limit the reach of § 364(e)
to "authorized postpetition loans and liens to secure such loans." Id. Judge Merritt, unlike the majority, assumed that the
order was severable. Finally, he argued that it was bad policy to allow prepetition lenders "to use their leverage in making
emergency loans in order to insulate their prepetition claims from attack." Id.
45. See infra text accompanying note 47 for the text of 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (1982).
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Subpart III.A. analyzes the difficult question of whether section 364(e) applies
at all to lender preference clauses. The resolution of the applicability issue is of
paramount importance. If section 364(e) does not apply, the lender is relegated to
general mootness and estoppel arguments, which, as discussed in subpart III.B.,
should not preclude a substantive appellate review. On the other hand, if section
364(e) does apply, the lender will be protected except in the case of inadequate notice
or fraud. Subpart lII.C. explains why the utilization of lender preference clauses
standing alone has not been enough to prove bad faith sufficient to deprive a lender
of section 364(e)'s protections.
A. The Dubious Applicability of Section 364(e) to the Appeal of Lender
Preference Clauses
Section 364(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a safe harbor for good faith
bankruptcy lenders. Those lenders are protected from the effects of an appellate
reversal or modification of a section 364 financing order when the order was not
stayed pending the appeal. 46 Section 364(e) provides:
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under this section to obtain credit
or incur debt, or of a grant under this section of a priority or a lien, does not affect the
validity of any debt so incurred, or any priority or lien so granted, to an entity that extended
such credit in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal,
unless such authorization and the incurring of such debt, or the granting of such priority or
lien, were stayed pending appeal. 47
The crucial first issue in determining whether a lender is protected by section
364(e) as to lender preference clauses in a financing order is whether section 364(e)
applies at all to such clauses. The two circuit cases addressing this question, Ellingsen
and Adams Apple, each concluded that section 364(e) did apply to lender preference
clauses.48 This Article asserts that those cases should not be followed and that section
364(e) should not prevent appellate review of the merits of lender preference clauses.
Section 364(e)'s principal purpose is the salutary one of facilitating reorganiza-
tions by inducing lending to Chapter 11 debtors. 49 The operative idea is that the
46. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 603; Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1487-88; In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945,
947 (7th Cir. 1982); Graphic Arts, 71 Bankr. at 776; Credit Alliance Corp. v. Dunning-Ray Ins. Agency (In re Blumer),
66 Bankr. 109, 113 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing § 364(e) as "[tihe strongest
statutory protection possible"); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Coon
Coxo. & ADMiN. NEws 5963, 6303; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO.
& ADmIN. NEws 5787, 5844.
"Section 364 financing order" means an order granting those priorities and liens expressly authorized in § 364.
Lender preference clauses are not expressly authorized by § 364. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (1982).
48. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 601-05; Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1488-89. See supra note 44 for a more detailed
discussion of these cases.
49. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 604; Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1488; Tabb, supra note 5, at 138. As the Seventh Circuit
stated in EDC Holding, 676 F.2d at 947, the leading case on § 364(e):
These provisions seek to overcome people's natural reluctance to deal with a bankrupt firm whether as purchaser
or lender by assuring them that so long as they are relying in good faith on a bankruptcy judge's approval of
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bankruptcy lender will never be at risk with regard to the validity of the transaction
in advancing funds to the debtor in possession. If a stay of the order is obtained, no
funds will be advanced; if no stay is obtained and the money is lent, then any appeal
will be dismissed as moot.50
Several competing arguments are made as to whether section 364(e)'s safe
harbor extends to lender preference clauses. The principal argument against applying
section 364(e) to lender preference clauses is based on the plain meaning of the statute
and reinforced by the statute's essential purpose to induce lending.51 The counter-
arguments for applying section 364(e) are: a different application of the inducement
policy;52 the "package" theory;53 the need to further finality;54 and estoppel.55
The primary argument made that lender preference clauses are not protected by
the transaction they need not worry about their priority merely because some creditor is objecting to the
transaction and is trying to get the district court or the court of appeals to reverse the bankruptcy judge.
Section 364(e) does not represent any new policy decision under the Code. Along with rule 8005, it is derived from
former FED. R. BANKR. P. 805 (as amended 1976) (repealed 1983) and, before that, FaD. R. BANrKR. P. 11-62(2) (1973)
(amended 1976) (repealed 1983). See Tabb, supra note 5, at 138 n.151. Those predecessor rules, which protected a good
faith purchaser of a "certificate of indebtedness" from an appellate reversal, were characterized by the Advisory
Committee Note as being "declaratory of existing case law." FaD. R. BAnR. P. 805 (Adv. Comm. Note 1976). The same
inducement rationale that underlies § 364(e) and R. 8005 supported the predecessor rules as well. See 14 COTlIER ON
Bs NKtuurcy 9 11-62.03, at 11-62-11 to -12 (14th ed. 1976).
"Certificates of indebtedness" were used under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended
by Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978), when a special priority or lien was granted to the
bankruptcy lender, but typically were not used in more routine credit extensions supported only by administrative expense
status. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 140. Thus, the certificate of indebtedness is the direct ancestor of I 1 U.S.C. § 364(c)
(1982) (providing for superpriority status, liens on unencumbered property, and junior liens on encumbered property) and
id. § 364(d) (providing for senior liens on already encumbered property). See Tabb, supra note 5, at 125. For a general
discussion of the use of certificates of indebtedness under the former Act, "-.e Baker, Certificates of Indebtedness in
Reorganization Proceedings: Analysis and Legislative Proposals, 50 Aht. BANhR. L.J. 1 (1976), and Tondel & Scott,
Trustee Certificates in Reorganization Proceedings Under the Bankruptcy Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 21 (1971). Certificates of
indebtedness are not used under the Code. See 2 COLLMR ON BANKRurCY 9 364.04[l], at 364-11 (15th ed. 1987).
No express lender protection rule covered noncertificate administrative priority lending in Act cases. The difference
in the rules governing the finality of certificate and noncertificate lending was based on the necessity to protect the
integrity of the more formal certificate process. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 140-41. Section 364 does not differentiate
between types of lending for purposes of lender protection, but instead applies the safe harbor of § 364(e) to all credit
extensions under § 364. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (1982). The significance of the limiting words "under this section" in
§ 364(e) is discussed infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
50. A party appealing a financing order entered under the authority of § 364 thus must obtain a stay of the order
to prevent the appeal from being dismissed as moot. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 604-05; In re Graphic Arts Lithographers,
71 Bankr. at 774, 776 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987). Bankruptcy rules 8005 and 7062 specify the stay procedure in bankruptcy
cases and must be read together. See In re Baldwin United Corp., 45 Bankr. 385, 386 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); 9 CotI R
ON BANKRUPcy, supra note 49, 919 7062.07, 8005.03, at 7062-8, 8005-04. The Advisory Committee Note to rule 8005
makes clear that rule 8005 is intended to implement § 364(e), referring specifically to the operative principle of § 364(e).
See FaD. R. BAnm. P. 8005 (Adv. Comm. Note 1987). Rule 8005 gives the particulars for obtaining a discretionary stay
pending appeal, and rule 7062 (which largely incorporates FaD. R. Civ. P. 62) deals with the stay of proceedings to
enforce a judgment. Obtaining a stay of a § 364 financing order is not a matter of right, but is subject to the discretion
of the bankruptcy judge. See In re Furst South Sav. Ass'n., 820 F.2d 700, 709 (5th Cir. 1987); 9 COLUE ON BAnrRvurcv,
supra note 49, 99 7062.07, 7062.09, 8005.03, at 7062-7, 7062-9, 8005-4. Rule 7062 expressly adds § 364 financing
orders to the list of exceptions to the automatic stay of FaD. R. Civ. P. 62(a). As will be discussed in more detail later
in the Article, the showing required to obtain a discretionary stay is a very high one, a point of importance for the
discussion following about whether the stay requirement should apply to lender preference clauses. See infra notes
130-39 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 100 and subpart III.B.2.
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section 364(e) is that section 364(e), on its face56 only applies to authorizations to
incur debt or to obtain credit "under this section," and to the granting of a priority
or lien "under this section," meaning, of course, section 364. 57 It is undisputed that
lender preference clauses are not provided for expressly anywhere in section 364 (or
anywhere else in the Code, for that matter). 58 The apparently straightforward
conclusion is that section 364(e), being limited by its own terms to section 364
financing orders, does not extend to nonsection 364 financing clauses such as lender
preference clauses.5 9
This plain meaning argument is consistent with the underlying purposes of
section 364(e). As noted, that section attempts to induce lenders to do business
postpetition with the debtor in possession by permitting those lenders to rely on the
finality of the authorizing financing order. 6° The priority of and security for funds
actually advanced postpetition thus cannot and should not be disturbed once the funds
are advanced. 61 By definition, however, the lender preference clauses are designed to
enhance in different ways the status of and the likelihood of repayment of funds
already advanced prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. 62 Striking such a
lender preference clause does not affect the security for or priority of the postpetition
loan made pursuant to the financing order.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, however, did not accept the plain meaning
argument. The Sixth Circuit in Ellingsen asserted without elaboration that it was not
aware of any case authority for such a proposition.63 The Ninth Circuit in Adams
Apple declined to interpret the language of section 364(e) as limiting the automatic
safe harbor of that section to those financing techniques expressly listed in section
364. Instead, the Adams Apple court, based on section 364(e)'s underlying policy of
inducing lending, read section 364 as impliedly authorizing lender preference clauses,
thus bringing those clauses within section 364(e)'s ambit. 64 According to the Ninth
Circuit, then, lender preference clauses do fall within section 364(e)'s inducement
policy because some lenders may choose to invest in the Chapter 11 debtor only
because of the possible extra profit to be realized from preferring their prepetition
56. See supra text accompanying note 47.
57. See In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 399, 601 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d
1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
58. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 119-21, 133, 137-40. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) states in
relevant part that "[t]he bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this tile." The propriety of invoking § 105(a) as the basis for the court's authority to approve
cross-collateralization clauses is debated by Tabb, supra note 5, at 153-74 (not proper), and Bohm, supra note 20, at
295-97 (proper).
59. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 607 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
60. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
61. For example, under 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (1982), the court may authorize the postpetition credit extension to
have "priority over any or all administrative expenses." Known as a "superpriority," this guarantees that the Chapter
11 lender will be first in line amongst Chapter I 1 claimants for payment out of the residue of the estate. See Tabb, supra
note 5, at 126-28, for a discussion of superpriority financing. Liens on specific property may be granted to secure the
postpetition loan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 99 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), and 364(d) (1982).
62. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the operation of lender preference clauses.
63. In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 602 (6th Cir. 1987).
64. In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1987). The lender preference clauses under
consideration were cross-collateralization clauses. Id. at 1486. See supra note 6 for an explanation of cross-
collateralization clauses.
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claim.65 Such an investment choice allegedly must be protected in order to encourage
bankruptcy lending. 66
The argument of the Ninth Circuit proves too much. While "slippery slope"
arguments sometimes may be unfairly made in rebuttal, 67 such a rebuttal argument is
merited here. The logical conclusion of the Adams Apple position is that any clause
in a financing order, no matter how egregious or how violative of the bankruptcy
laws, cannot be stricken on appeal if a stay were not obtained.6 8 Surely it is not good
bankruptcy jurisprudence to exalt one policy-here, the inducing of postpetition
loans-over all other bankruptcy policies without even the possibility of appellate
review. So interpreted, section 364(e) becomes an invitation to bankruptcy judges to
disregard the law. Given the dynamics surrounding the entry of financing orders, in
which the lender has the judge at its mercy, 69 this invitation is unwise.
If it is conceded that some clauses are too outrageous to be upheld even under
the Adams Apple theory, then the question of whether there can be appellate review
turns on the extent of the substantive unfairness of the clause. 70 Indeed, a careful
reading of the opinions shows that the mootness holdings in Adams Apple and in
Ellingsen were based in part on those courts' view that the contested clauses were not
too offensive on the merits. 71 That approach undermines their procedural argument,
however. If a merit review can be undertaken, then the lender cannot rely with
certainty on the protection of its favored clause. 72
The foregoing criticisms of the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the plain meaning
65. Id. at 1488-89 n.9.
66. See also Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 602. The Ninth Circuit also gave some weight to the finality policy, stating that
appellate review of financing orders that had not been stayed and under which funds had been lent "would intrude on a
reorganization process already underway and would interfere with the lender's ability to plan for its outlay of funds."
Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1489. As discussed in subpart HLI.B, infra, the Adams Apple court is suggesting, based partly
on finality concepts, that it might find an appeal moot on general mootness principles, irrespective of § 364(e). See infra
notes 118-22 and accompanying text. This approach overstates the intended scope of the mootness doctrine. The issue
must be clearly focused as to whether finality itself, separate and distinct from questions of remedial effectiveness that
underlie mootness, requires dismissing the appeal. I conclude below that finality should not be given such pre-emptive
weight here. See infra notes 93-96 and 123-24 and accompanying text.
67. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HAItv. L. REv. 361 (1985).
68. A creditor probably could not obtain a stay. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
69. See supra Part II.
70. The good faith of the lender cannot serve as an adequate check, because the lender's self-interest dictates that
it should try to obtain all possible benefits in return for financing. While Adam Smith's "invisible hand" may work in
a free enterprise situation, so that the maximum economic result is obtained by every entity's unfettered pursuit of its own
self-interest, the rationale breaks down when one party has a position of dominance or control, as the prebankruptcy lender
often does in a Chapter 11 case. See supra Part II.
71. In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 602-03 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d
1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987). The Sixth and Ninth Circuits may be utilizing an "abuse of discretion" standard, pursuant
to which the merits of the trial court's action are reviewed, but on the very deferential basis of whether that court abused
its discretion in approving the lender preference clauses. The Fifth Circuit in In re First South Sav. Ass'n, 820 F.2d 700,
705 (5th Cir. 1987), used this standard in granting a petition for mandamus directing the issuance of a stay of a standard
§ 364 financing order. In the lender preference context an abuse of discretion standard will not work well, because the
bankruptcy court has little choice but to approve the clause requested, as seen in Part II, and thus in a real sense is not
exercising its discretion at all.
72. The appellate court should acknowledge straightforwardly that it is undertaking a merit review and not hide
behind some procedural legerdemain. Doing so would sharpen the decision-making process on the merits by the appellate
court. In addition, precedential confusion stems from a merit-driven decision disguised as a procedural decision. Other
courts, which might entertain more serious doubts about the substantive validity of lender preference clauses, may be
influenced on the separate procedural question by the holdings in Ellingsen and Adams Apple.
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argument in favor of a strained application of section 364(e)'s inducement policy
assumes that lenders really do rely on lender protection clauses and that such reliance
deserves protection. These assumptions may be unwarranted. In an earlier article
attacking the substantive validity of cross-collateralization clauses, I questioned
whether lenders in fact rely on the presence or absence of a cross-collateralization
clause in deciding whether or not to lend to the debtor in possession. 73 Other factors,
such as enhancing the recovery on prepetition collateral and increasing the dividend
on prepetition unsecured claims, may instead be determinative. 74 If cross-collateral-
ization clauses are available, however, lenders will take advantage of them, whether
actually necessary to induce lending or not. 75
Furthermore, even if the lender did rely on the lender preference clause in
making the loan, that reliance may not deserve protection. The real issue is whether
lender preference clauses are so contrary to the Bankruptcy Code that they should not
be enforced; saying that those clauses must be given effect because the lender
expected such a result simply begs the essential question. The critical reliance of the
lender is protected even if the lender preference clauses are not, as the lender's
security for and priority of the monies advanced postpetition will not be affected. 76
The only complaint the lender then can make is that it did not receive the full reward
promised for the postpetition loan. 77 As stated, however, the question is the
legitimacy of promising that reward. 78
Furthermore, it is not clear why the lender should be entitled to rely on all of the
provisions in the order. Cases like Ellingsen and Adams Apple permit the lender to
bootstrap questionable provisions into a status of legality by insulating them within
the cocoon of an otherwise allowable order and then "relying" on the integrity of that
order. In many areas of the law a party operating close to the line where legality
crosses over into illegality assumes the risk of an erroneous assessment of on which
side of the line its behavior falls. So too the bankruptcy lender utilizing a questionable
clause should have to assume the risk that it guessed wrong as to the legality of that
clause.
In addition, the lender who obtains a lender preference clause is a monopolist.
Indeed, the requirements for approving such clauses dictate that the lender must in
73. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 144-45, 167-68.
74. The timing of the financing in Adams Apple is instructive with regard to the question of the actual reliance of
the lender on the order. The lender advanced $48,000 even before the first temporary hearing, and $200,000 more before
the final authorization. Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1486.
75. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 166-68.
76. In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1101 (2d Cir. 1979).
77. See Adams Apple, 829 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987). The same argument is made in a slightly different way
pursuant to the "package theory," by suggesting that the lender effectively is trading alternative forms of compensation
for the lender preference clauses. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. See also Tabb, supra note 5, at 169-70.
78. Furthermore, the lender did not characterize the lender preference clause as compensation for the postpetition
loan, but as repayment of the prepetition loan, and should not be able later to recharacterize the provision for its own
benefit. Forcing the lender to characterize the clauses properly as compensation would allow the bankruptcy court to make
a more accurate assessment of the true recovery the lender is seeking, decreasing the likelihood that the court will approve
a financing order which carries the possibility of exorbitant returns for the lender. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 144-45,
169-70. For example, if the court had not vacated the cross-collateralization clause in Texlon, the lender would have
realized a return of approximately 240% per year based on the clause.
19891
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
fact occupy a monopoly position.79 The lender's monopoly profit, which can be
exorbitant,80 should not be enforced. This profit could not be obtained elsewhere.
The operative assumption of the Adams Apple court that the lending climate in
Chapter 11 must be improved in order to compete with non-Chapter 11 lending
opportunitiessl mischaracterizes the situation. The Chapter 11 monopoly lender has
an inherently superior status compared to having to lend in a competitive market.
Restoration of competitive balance in lending markets does not require increasing the
available compensation to lenders in the form of lender protection clauses.
The applicability of section 364(e) to lender preference clauses has also been
supported by the so-called "package" theory.82 This theory is a close relative of the
Ninth Circuit's inducement argument83 and adds little of substance to that argument.
Courts, however, give the package theory independent weight. 84 This theory extends
section 364(e) protection to nonsection 364 lender preference clauses because those
clauses are included in the same financing order-the same "package"-as
legitimate section 364 clauses, which are without dispute entitled to the safe harbor
of section 364(e). All clauses of the order assertedly deserve equivalent protection
because the lender theoretically negotiated the financing order as a unitary, integrated
package and may have given up some other potential benefits in exchange for the
lender preference clauses.85 Because the lender has done so, it would be both unfair
S6
and a perversion of the intent and meaning of the financing order for a court to sever
out and deny protection to the lender preference clauses. Thus, although the lender
preference clauses standing alone in an order might not qualify for section 364(e)
protection,8 7 they are saved by their association in an order with qualified section 364
provisions.
The package theory should be rejected as a basis for bringing nonsection 364
lender preference clauses within the scope of section 364(e)'s protection. Just like the
79. See supra Part II. See also Tabb, supra note 5, at 145, 163. In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), sets out the required elements for approving a cross-collateralization clause. These elements
illustrate the monopoly position the bankruptcy lender must have: "(I) Absent the proposed financing, its [debtor's]
business operations will not survive.. . ; (2) It is unable to obtain alternative financing on acceptable terms . . . ; (3)
The proposed lender will not accede to less preferential terms... ; and (4) The proposed financing is in the best interests
of the general creditor body." Id. at 366.
80. See supra note 78 for a discussion of the profit that would have been realized in TexIon.
81. Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1488.
82. This theory also could be termed "salvation by association," because the otherwise unprotected lender
preference clauses gain protection by their association in an order with protected clauses.
83. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's arguments.
84. See, e.g., In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 602 (6th Cir. 1987) ("This aspect of the order
[referring to the waiver of objections clause], however, was part of the whole 'package' authorized under § 364(c).")
85. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 138-39, 169-70; see also D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS & MATRIAt.S
ON BANKRUPTCY 530 (1985). The courts have not fully fleshed out this argument, although the district court came close
in In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 65 Bankr. 358, 365 n.7 (W.D. Mich. 1986). In that case, the Sixth Circuit relied
implicitly on the package concept. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 602, 603.
86. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1986), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a court may only
approve or disapprove a settlement agreement, but may not modify that agreement and force the parties to accept the
modified agreement. The contention that the waiver of attorneys' fees in the class action settlement was "forced," id. at
723, was not accepted by the Court. Id. at 728.
87. The Ellingsen and Adams Apple courts, however, probably would apply § 364(e) protection to lender
preference clauses standing alone, based on the reliance or inducement theory. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 602-04; In re
Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Sixth and Ninth Circuits' inducement theory, the package theory proves too much. Its
logic suggests that any provision included in a financing order also containing
legitimate section 364 clauses is not subject to appellate review unless a discretionary
stay is granted. This approach obviously carries with it serious potential for abuse, a
potential realized in cases like Adams Apple and Ellingsen. 8 The bankruptcy court,
as discussed earlier, 89 functionally provides little or no check on the lender.
The underlying justifications for the package theory cannot withstand close
scrutiny. The strongest justification is that the lender may have traded away other
beneficial clauses9° for the lender preference clauses. The dynamics of the typical
situation in which such orders are generated, however, suggest that the lender has not
given away anything, but instead has taken everything it thinks it can get.9' Even if
negotiation did occur, it does not logically follow that possibly illegal clauses can be
justified because they were taken in trade for legal clauses. 92
Courts holding that section 364(e) extends to nonsection 364 lender preference
clauses also have given weight to the idea that the lender is entitled to and the
bankruptcy system needs finality and repose for orders. 93 Indeed, in Part IV of this
Article, I conclude that courts considering motions for relief from the judgment have
given insufficient weight to the concept of finality. Finality is not, however,
controlling and pre-emptive, but instead must be balanced with competing policies.
88. Probably the most important lender preference clause for the banks in Ellingsen was not the cross-
collateralization clause, but instead the clause that waived all objections to the validity of the banks' four million dollar
prepetition security position. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 600-01. An independent order accomplishing the same settlement
would have been subject to the very strict scrutiny dictated by the Supreme Court in Protective Comm. for Indep.
Stockholders v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968). Despite this, in Ellingsen the Sixth Circuit permitted the banks to avoid
Anderson scrutiny by characterizing the waiver clause not as a "settlement" but as a condition of the postpetition
financing order. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 604. The dissent protested that "[tlhe banks here should not be permitted to make
several million dollars in prepetition loans secured and uncontestable at the expense of the other creditors by the simple
expedient of making a § 364 postpetition loan." Id. at 607 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The district court's attitude highlights
the danger of abuse even more clearly: it refused Anderson scrutiny because it did not characterize the financing order "as
purely the settlement of a controversy." Ellingsen, 65 Bankr. at 365.
Similarly, potential for abuse exists with regard to cross-collateralization and cross-superprioritization clauses, which
directly violate the fundamental bankruptcy norm of equality between similarly situated creditors by preferring the
lender's prepetition unsecured claim over all other unsecured claims. See supra notes 6, 8. Whether countervailing
policies necessitate subordinating the equality norm is a difficult question to resolve on the merits. The package theory,
however, forecloses the possibility of appellate review of the merits of controversial provisions.
89. See supra Part In.
90. In particular, the argument is made that a lower interest rate might have been accepted in return for the lender
preference clauses. See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 85, at 530; Tabb, supra note 5, at 170; Initial Financing
Restrictions, supra note 19, at 1686.
91. Indeed, the substantive elements for approving a cross-collateralization clause require that the lender be in a
monopoly position able to dictate the terms of the financing order without negotiation. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text. Experience suggests that lenders in such a situation present financing orders on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis and that lender preference clauses are becoming standard parts of the lender's financing order forms. If such a
scenario is accurate, then much of the rationale for protecting the lender disappears.
92. In my earlier article on cross-collateralization I suggested the possibility that the proper conclusion to be drawn
from an application of the reliance and package theories in combination with the plain meaning of § 364(e) is not either
(1) that a bifurcated system exists with cross-collateralization clauses permissible but not protected by § 364(e), which
would be contrary to the package and reliance theories but consistent with the plain meaning of the section, or (2) that
cross-collateralization clauses are permissible and protected, which would be consistent with the package and reliance
theories but not with the plain meaning of § 364(e), but instead that cross-collateralization clauses are illegal per se, which
would give full effect to the package and reliance theories and to the plain meaning of § 364(e). See Tabb, supra note
5, at 137-39.
93. See In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1987).
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The countervailing policy to that of finality is the desire to implement correctly the
substantive aims of the bankruptcy laws in a fair and equitable way after thoughtful
consideration. 94 The task is to reach an appropriate accommodation.
The balance is properly struck by requiring a timely appeal of the financing
order, but allowing review of the questionable lender preference clauses pursuant to
the appeal. Under this approach, the lender would know within ten days of the entry
of the financing order whether or not the lender preference clauses were under
attack. 95 If an appeal were filed within that time, the lender would have to live with
the uncertainty that the order might be overturned, an uncertainty inherent in the
concept of appeal. Finality cannot be given so much weight that normal appellate
practice is abandoned.
The courts' confusion as to the role of finality in the case of appeals results from
a failure to separate concepts. In the appellate context all that finality dictates is that
the appeal be filed within the required time limits. Finality also dictates that no attack
on the judgment should be allowed after the time for filing an appeal except under the
strict requirements of rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 96 Finality
does not, however, require dismissing an appeal that is timely filed. Dismissing a
timely filed appeal should be based on something other than finality: mootness, 97 the
need to induce lending to Chapter 11 debtors,98 a lack of equitable behavior on the
part of the appellants, 99 or the like. 00
94. See, e.g., In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Lake (In re Cada
Investments), 664 F.2d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 1981); Bill Roderick Distrib. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.),
50 Bankr. 756, 760 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); see infra note 219 and accompanying text.
95. FED. R. BANKr. P. 8002(a).
96. See infra Part IV.
97. See infra subpart UI.B.I.
98. See supra notes 49-50 and 60-81 and accompanying text.
99. See infra subpart III.B.2.
100. A final theory advanced by the courts in granting § 364(e) protection to lenders for lender preference clauses
is a variation of an estoppel argument. Subpart III.B.2. below explains why a true estoppel argument should not be
accepted as a basis for dismissing an appeal of the lender preference clauses in a financing order. The cases raising an
estoppel under § 364(e) reason as follows. The estoppel is based on a statement in the financing order that the mootness
provisions of § 364(e) will apply to all the provisions of the order, including the lender preference clauses. The lender
supposedly is entitled to rely on that statement in advancing funds. The objecting creditors who fall to obtain a stay,
knowing of the statement in the order and of the probable reliance of the lender on that statement, are estopped to assert
that the statement of § 364(e)'s applicability is in error. See In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 558, 606 (6th
Cir. 1987) (Nelson, J., concurring); In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1488-89 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987).
This § 364(e) estoppel theory is absurd. A lower court cannot create procedural requisites for the appeal of its own
decisions. Such a court has no jurisdiction to dictate appellate requirements, and therefore any reliance by the lender is
unjustified. In a similar vein, the appealing creditors are free to ignore any such supposed requirements. To paraphrase
an old maxim, saying so just does not make it so. The mootaess holding in a true § 364 case stems from the statute, not
from anything the bankruptcy court does or does not say. The very issue this Part has been considering is whether the
statutory provisions extend to situations not expressly covered therein. It is no answer to say that the lower court thinks
the statute does apply to those cases. The statute either does or does not apply; what the lower court thinks is irrelevant.
In fact, the courts invoking this theory are concerned about the failure of the appealing creditors to obtain a stay of
the financing order. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 603, 606 (Nelson, J., concurring). These creditors are perceived as having
acted inequitably, to the lender's potential detriment. This concern, however, has nothing to do with § 364(e), but instead
raises questions about the propriety in general of dismissing an appeal because of inequitable conduct by the appellant,
an issue that will be examined in subpart IU.B.2.
LENDER PREFERENCE CLAUSES
B. The Inapplicability of General Principles of Mootness and Estoppel to the
Appeal of Lender Preference Clauses
Assuming that section 364(e) should not prevent an appellate court from passing
on the validity of lender preference clauses, it is still possible that the appeal could
be dismissed based on general principles of mootness or estoppel, which apply to all
appellate cases irrespective of the provisions of any particular statute or rule.101 In the
present context, the general argument is that the appellants should get a stay to
preserve the status quo while the appeal is decided. This subpart of the Article
concludes that appeals of lender preference clauses should not be dismissed based
either on mootness or estoppel.
1. Mootness
The mootness doctrine goes to the basic question of the function of the court.
Indeed, on its most fundamental level, mootness is based on the case or controversy
requirement of article III of the Constitution.102 Mootness decisions do not turn solely
on constitutional grounds, but are predicated just as much on jurisprudential
considerations having to do with remedial effectiveness and wise judicial
administration.' 0 3 Courts eschew rigid, formalistic rules in this area and instead
attempt to ascertain the feasibility or futility of potential appellate relief on a case by
case basis.'14
In the lender preference context, the mootness argument emphasizes the fact that
the lender has advanced money to the debtor pursuant to the appealed order,
supposedly making it impossible for the appellate court to grant effective relief, since
it cannot restore the status quo ante.'0 5 Bankruptcy appeals in other contexts have
been dismissed as moot based on the rationale that circumstances have changed
during the pendency of the appeal that make it impossible for the appellate court
101. See Algeran, Inc. v. Advance Ross Corp., 759 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); King Resources Stockholders'
Protective Comm. v. Baer (In re King Resources Co.), 651 F.2d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1980); Casady v. Bucher (In re
Royal Properties, Inc.), 621 F.2d 984, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1980); Bennett v. Gemmill (In re Combined Metals Reduction
Co.), 557 F.2d 179, 188-89 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. See In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 13A C. WRIGHT, A. M1Int & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACncE AND PRocanuar § 3533.1, at 215 (2d ed. 1984); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
88 H. v. L. REv. 373, 374-76 (1974) [hereinafter Mootness Doctrine].
103. See 13 C. NVfuoTrr, A. Mnj.ER & E. CooPn, supra note 102, § 3533.1, at 222.
104. See AOV Indus., 792 F.2d at 1147-48. The court must consider as well the importance of the parties'
respective interests. See 13 C. WmotaH, A. MILYER & E. COOPER, supra note 102, § 3533.3, at 300. The party claiming
mootness has the burden of proof. See id. § 3533.1, at 56 (Supp. 1988).
105. The general principle that mootness must follow from an inability to give effective relief was stated by the
Supreme Court in a seminal mootness case:
The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which
can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It necessarily follows that
when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event
occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant
him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). The function of the stay pending appeal, then, is to preserve the status quo,
thereby preventing mootness. See, e.g., Combined Metals, 557 F.2d at 194; In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 369 F. Supp. I 11,
116 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
19891
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:109
to give effective relief. Most of the cases have involved a bankruptcy court order
authorizing a sale of property, with the sale then being closed before the merits of the
appeal can be heard. 10 6 A few cases have involved an order confirming a
reorganization plan, with the plan then being implemented in large part before the
appeal can be heard. 107 Even in that situation, however, other cases have held that at
least that part of the plan not yet implemented could be reviewed on appeal.108
Of course, obtaining a stay of the financing order would eliminate the potential
mootness problem, but the failure to obtain a stay pending appeal leads to mootness
only if it is impossible for the appellate court to give meaningful, effective relief
because of changed circumstances. 19 Courts call for "remedial inventiveness."" 0
Furthermore, appellate courts have not hesitated to find bankruptcy court orders only
partially moot."' In other words, the part of the order that can be dealt with
effectively will not be found moot. This partial mootness approach has been invoked
most often in the case of confirmed reorganization plans that have been partially
implemented.' 12 Other bankruptcy appeals not found moot usually involve the
payment of money to a party, typically an attorney seeking compensation.11 3 Even if
the compensation has already been paid, the courts have found the compensation
order not moot. Relief can be granted by ordering the return of the money paid.
These mootness principles suggest that an appeal of a financing order containing
lender preference clauses should at most be only partially mooted if no stay is
106. See, e.g., In re Andy Frain Servs., 798 F.2d 1113, 1125 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Abbotts Dairies, 788 F.2d 143,
146-47 (3d Cir. 1986); Willemain v. Kurtz (In re Willemain), 764 F.2d 1019, 1023 (4th Cir. 1985); Hoese Corp. v.
Vetter Corp. (In re Vetter Corp.), 724 F.2d 52, 55-56 (7th Cir. 1983); Bleaufontaine, Inc. v. Roland Int'l (In re
Bleaufontaine, Inc.), 634 F.2d 1383, 1389-90 (5th Cir. 1981). In these cases the appellate courts routinely concluded that
they were without power to unwind the completed sale and thus could not give the appellants attacking the sale
authorization any relief. The result was particularly obvious to the courts when the affected purchasers were not even
parties to the appeal, see, e.g., Casady v. Bucher, 621 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1980), although the result did not change
when the purchasers were parties to the appeal. See, e.g., Algcran, Inc. v. Advance Ross Corp., 759 F.2d 1421, 1424
(9th Cir. 1985); Greylock Glen Corp. v. Community Say. Bank, 656 F.2d 1, 3-4 (Ist Cir. 1981). Most of those holdings
are based on the current bankruptcy statute, 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (1982), see, e.g., Sulmeyer v. Karbach Enter. (In re
Exennium, Inc.), 715 F.2d 1401, 1403-04 (9th Cir. 1983), or the bankruptcy rule, FED. R. BANKR. P. 805 (1973)
(repealed 1983), that preceded § 363(m), see, e.g., Schupak v. Dutch Inn, 614 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1980), that
specifically provide for mootness when no stay of the sale authorization order is obtained. The opinions, however, make
clear that the rule or statute merely declares the existing mootness law. See, e.g., A & H Holding Corp. v. O'Donnell
(In re Abingdon Realty), 530 F.2d 588, 590 (4th Cir. 1976).
107. See In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1146-50 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Trone v. Roberts Farms (In re Roberts
Farms), 652 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1981).
108. See AOVlndus., 792 F.2d at 1148-50; In re King Resources, Co., 651 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (10th Cir. 1980).
109. See Rosner v. Worcester (In re Worcester), 811 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1987) (court not "'powerless" to
set aside a foreclosure sale under applicable state law); Dahlquist v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Dahlquist), 751 F.2d 295,
298-99 (8th Cir. 1985) (not "impossible" to order return of money paid pursuant to interim compensation order). Indeed,
in one important bankruptcy case involving an appeal from an order confirming a reorganization plan, the Tenth Circuit
held that part of the order was not moot even though the court was unsure exactly what remedies could have been given
if it had reversed. King Resources, 651 F.2d at 1332 & n.4.
110. See 13 C. WIGHr, A. MIual & E. CooPER, supra note 102, § 3533.3, at 300.
111. SeeAOVlndus., 792 F.2d at 1148-50; King Resources, 651 F.2d at 1332; In re Combined Metals Reduction
Co., 557 F.2d 179, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1977).
112. See cases cited supra note 11I. In those cases, the appellate courts have found moot only those parts of the
confirmation order that have been implemented. The parts still to be performed can be affected by an appellate reversal.
The courts talk in terms of the "continuing impact" of the plan. Combined Metals, 557 F.2d at 194-95. See also 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. M11.R & E. CoopER, supra note 102, § 3533.2, at 249-51.
113. In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Dahlquist, 751 F.2d at 297-99; Salomon v. Logan
(In re International Envtl. Dynamics, Inc.), 718 F.2d 322, 325-26 (9th Cir. 1983).
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obtained and the lender advances funds based on the financing order. The only
change in circumstances flowing from the order is the making of the loan. Assuming,
as is almost certainly the case, that the debtor has spent the money, no effective relief
can be given with regard to the part of the financing order relating to the extension
of funds postpetition1 4 without unfairly prejudicing the lender. Effective relief can be
given by the appellate court with regard to the lender preference clauses, however, by
striking those clauses. 115 The lender preference clauses do not affect in any way the
money advanced postpetition, but only direct that the lender's prepetition claim,
which by definition was fixed and established before the bankruptcy financing order
was entered, be accorded some preferential treatment. 116 No changes have occurred
with regard to that prepetition claim, other than a declaration of a change in rights.
That declaration can be withdrawn."17
The lender's response will be that a change in circumstances has taken
place-the postpetition funds were advanced. 118 The lender will argue that the
postpetition loan would not have been made but for the possibility of an additional
benefit on the lender's prepetition claim.' 9 In short, the lender will argue that it
relied upon the financing order, 120 that the financing order was a package deal, 12 1 and
that part of the package relied upon cannot be taken away. 122 These arguments, which
were discussed and rejected in the preceding Part of this Article, are not mootness
arguments because, as suggested above, effective relief can be given with regard to
114. Thus, those provisions in the financing order authorizing the postpetition loan, granting security for those
extensions, and establishing the priority for the funds advanced cannot effectively be reversed to the extent funds have
been advanced. The appellate court can give effective relief as to that part of the loan authorization which has not yet been
acted upon, because there will not yet have been a change in circumstances with regard to that part of the loan
authorization. See Bohm, supra note 20, at 309-10 n.70.
115. The lender will be a party to the appeal and, thus, be before the appellate court, a necessary predicate to the
granting of relief against the lender. See, e.g., In re Royal Properties, Inc., 621 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1980).
116. See supra note 6 for discussion of lender preference clauses.
117. The case against mootness gets a bit more difficult in the unusual case in which payments are made to the lender
on its prepetition claim pursuant to the lender preference clauses before the appellate action occurs. This is not common
because the lender will be repaid first for the postpetition advances and then for the prepetition claim. Even if payment
is made to the lender, however, relief, for mootness purposes, could be effected by ordering the lender to return that
payment, as illustrated by the attorneys' compensation cases. See supra note 113. This approach is consistent with the
general rule that payment of a money judgment does not moot an appeal of that judgment. See, e.g., United States ex.
rel. Morgan & Son Earth Moving v. Timberland Paving & Constr., 745 F.2d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 1984). One financing
order case held that the appeal was not moot even though the bankruptcy lender, after the debtor's postpetition default,
had been paid the proceeds of the sold collateral, since the lender could be ordered to repay the money. Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Dunning-Ray Ins. Agency (In re Blumer), 66 Bankr. 109, 113 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986). That case goes further
than is needed in our hypothetical case, since the payment was on funds actually advanced postpetition and the lender
had relied on the authorization to extend the loan. The Blumer court emphasized that normally § 364(e) would apply, even
though general mootnars principles did not apply, id., thus making clear that § 364(e) goes beyond the dictates of
traditional mootness doctrine.
If the lender's prepetition claim has not been repaid in full, the appellate court should always review the validity of
the lender preference clauses, since those clauses will have a "continuing impact," see supra note 112, with regard to
future assets generated by the bankruptcy estate.
118. This argument is discussed supra notes 65-66 and 76-78 and accompanying text in connection with the
question of whether § 364(e) applies to lender preference clauses.
119. See, e.g., In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
120. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
122. The Ninth Circuit in dicta in Adams Apple took this view, suggesting that mootness, apart even from § 364(e),
exists as soon as the postpetition loan is made. Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1489.
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the lender preference clauses simply by striking them. 123 The money loaned
postpetition by the lender either will or will not be repaid based on facts that have
nothing to do with the existence or nonexistence of the lender preference clauses. 124
2. Estoppel
A second general basis for dismissing appeals of possible relevance to the lender
preference context is estoppel. Estoppel has been recognized as separate from
mootness as a basis for dismissing a bankruptcy appeal. t25 The linchpin of the
estoppel theory is the idea that the objecting creditors are at fault for not obtaining a
stay 126 and that their inequitable conduct led to a prejudicial change in
123. Effective relief also can be given in the unusual case where payment is already made to the lender by ordering
the return of money paid out pursuant to the lender preference clauses. See supra note 117.
124. A final mootness concept deserves mention. That is the idea that some questions should be decided by the
appellate court even if no effective relief can be given to the appellant in this case, if the case falls within the narrow
exception for cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See generally 13 C. ViGotr, A. MIER & E. CooPER,
supra note 102, § 3533.8, at 370-91; Moomess Doctrine, supra note 102, at 386-88. This doctrine requires a showing
that this type of dispute is likely to recur, that the dispute is again likely to evade review, and that this appellant will be
affected. See 13 C. Weirotr, A. MLER & E. CooPER, supra note 102, § 3533.8, at 378-80; Mooness Doctrine, supra
note 102, at 386-88. The creditors appealing an order authorizing lender preference clauses would argue that: (1) this type
of dispute is likely to recur, since lender preference clauses are being commonly used in bankruptcy cases; (2) the dispute
is likely to evade review, since the requirements for granting a discretionary stay of the financing order are in all cases
inherently inconsistent with the emergency-based requirements for granting lender preference clauses, see infra notes
130-39 and accompanying text, and absent a stay nothing is to stop future lenders from going forward with financing once
the order is entered; and (3) either they specifically or the group of bankruptcy unsecured creditors will be adversely
affected by the future financing orders containing lender preference clauses. While extension of the affected class to
"unsecured creditors" stretches standard doctrine, which requires this appellant to show he will be affected; see 13 C.
VsrGtrr, A. MILtes & E. CooPER, supra note 102, § 3533.8, at 382-83, such an extension is necessary, or review will
be avoided for the whole group. See Mootness Doctrine, supra note 102, at 386-87.
One appellate court rejected the application of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine in the context
of mootness arising from a failure to get stays in bankruptcy cases. Bennett v. Gemmill (In re Combined Metals Reduction
Co.), 557 F.2d 179, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1977). The court's principal rationale was that the only reason that the issue would
evade review was because of a failure by the appellants to obtain a stay, which is not a sufficient reason. The court seemed
to be suggesting that the failure to obtain a stay was attributable to the appellants and could be rectified by more diligent
pursuit of their rights. This suggestion would not be true in financing cases, when the appellants would find it almost
impossible to obtain a stay. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text. Furthermore, what then should be the result
in cases like Adams Apple, in which the appellants did ask for a stay, but had their request denied? In re Adams Apple,
Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1486-87 (9th Cir. 1987); see supra note 44 and infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. The
Combined Metals court also stated that the dispute could not recur with regard to the specific asset sold, CombinedMetals,
557 F.2d at 190-91, but this is too literal of an interpretation of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine,
which refers only to this type of dispute.
Regardless of the theoretical applicability of the doctrine in the financing context, however, it is likely that the
attitude reflected in Combined Metals in the sale context would prevail in the financing context as well, and the appellants
therefore would have only a minimal chance of successfully invoking the doctrine. But see United States v. Marine Power
& Equip. Co. (In re Marine Power & Equip. Co.), 71 Bankr. 925, 927 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (order entered extending
automatic stay despite expiration of 30-day period of § 362(e) within which relief supposedly must be ordered, on theory
that procedures followed are defective and likely to be repeated, requiring relief to be given to protect affected parties).
125. The leading case establishing that estoppel is a basis independent from mootness for dismissing a bankruptcy
appeal is Trone v. Roberts Farms (In re Roberts Farms), 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981) ("An entirely separate and
independent ground for dismissal has also been established because Appellants have failed and neglected diligently to
pursue their available remedies to obtain a stay of the objectionable orders of the Bankruptcy Court and have permitted
such a comprehensive change of circumstances to occur as to render it inequitable for this court to consider the merits of
the appeal.") (plan of arrangement).
126. For example, the swing vote in Ellingsen was Judge Nelson, who concurred with the holding that the appeal
should be dismissed, based on a vague estoppel notion. In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 606 (6th Cir.
1987) (Nelson, J., concurring) ("The unsecured creditors having been made aware of the bankruptcy court's position that
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circumstances.1 27 Two reasons exist for not applying the estoppel ground for
dismissal here. First, the nature of the change in circumstances is not the type
requiring dismissal. The only change in circumstances that occurs if no stay is
obtained is that the lender advances funds postpetition to the debtor in possession. As
discussed earlier, 128 those aspects of the financing integrally connected to this
postpetition loan should be, and are, protected. The lender preference clauses,
however, are severable from the postpetition loan, because they relate to the
prepetition claim, and no change in circumstances has occurred with regard to the
prepetition claim.129 For this reason alone, the lack of equity ground should not lead
to dismissal, even if the appellants really were negligent in not requesting a stay.
Second, and more significantly, it is nonsense to say that the appellants are "at
fault" for failing to obtain a stay. Indeed, in the context of emergency financing
orders, it would be virtually impossible for them to obtain a stay, for granting one
would be inherently inconsistent with the emergency predicate for these financing
orders. 130 More generally, a discretionary stay is considered "extraordinary
relief," 131 allowed only when the four requirements 132 for a preliminary injunction 33
are "clearly established": 134
(I) whether the movant is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is not granted;
(3) whether the granting of the stay would substantially harm the other parties; and
(4) whether the granting of the stay would serve the public interest. 135
The third requirement, whether the granting of the stay would substantially harm
the other parties, and the fourth requirement, whether granting the stay is in the public
interest, are inherently inconsistent with the substantive requirements for granting
under Section 364(e) the validity of the replacement liens would not be affected by reversal on appeal unless the amended
order were stayed, it seems to me that the unsecured creditors acted at their peril in failing to obtain such a stay.")
(emphasis added). This position is absurd. See supra note 100.
127. Some cases addressing the question of whether an appeal of an order directing the payment of attorneys' fees
should be dismissed when no stay of the order was obtained and the fees were paid have refused to extend the Roberts
Farms principle and have permitted the appeals to proceed. See Dahlquist v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Dahlquist), 751 F.2d
295, 298-99 (8th Cir. 1985); Salomon v. Logan (In re International Envtl. Dynamics, Inc.), 718 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir.
1983). Each of those cases relied upon the fact that the attorney who had been paid the money knew that the order was
being contested. In our situation the lender would know of the contest within the 10-day time period for filing an appeal
under FEe. R. BANKX. P. 8002(a).
128. See supra notes 61-62 and 76 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 61-62, 76, and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 79.
131. In re Great Barrington Fair and Amusement, Inc., 53 Bankr. 237, 239 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
132. Usually all four elements must be satisfied, In re Charter Co., 72 Bankr. 70, 72 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In
re Smoldt, 68 Bankr. 533, 535 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); In re Sung Hi Lim, 7 Bankr. 319, 321 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980),
although the weight given to each may vary depending on the strength of the others and the exact circumstances involved.
See In re First South Say. Ass'n, 820 F.2d 700, 709 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1987); Charter Co., 72 Bankr. at 72; Great
Barrington, 53 Bankr. at 239.
133. The standards for issuance of a discretionary stay pending appeal are the same as those for issuance of a
preliminary injunction under FED. R. Civ. P. 65. See, e.g., In re Baldwin United Corp., 45 Bankr. 385, 386 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1984); Commonwealth Nat'l Bank v. Dobslaw (In re Dobslaw), 20 Bankr. 922, 924 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd,
712 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984); In re Tolco Properties, Inc., 6 Bankr. 490, 491 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1980).
134. Baldwin United, 45 Bankr. at 386.
135. First South, 820 F.2d at 709.
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lender preference clauses, and accordingly it is extremely unlikely that a stay would
ever be granted in such a case. A primary justification for having Chapter 11
reorganizations is the public interest in saving a business, with the attendant
economic benefits to society. 136 The harm that would occur both to the "other
parties" and to the "public interest" if the stay is granted is that the loan would not
be made immediately, and the debtor's reorganization then would likely fail because
of a lack of needed operating capital. 137 Yet, a prerequisite for a court to approve a
requested lender preference clause is that the debtor prove that "absent the proposed
financing, its business operations will not survive." 138 It is difficult to see how a
court could make a finding of fact that the financing must be made immediately to
save the reorganization and then turn around and stay that financing. 139
The Catch-22 situation facing the objecting creditors is clearly shown by the
Adams Apple case. In that case, the creditors did request a stay from the bankruptcy
court, but the request was denied. 140 The financing was made, and the appeal then
was declared moot. 14 1 The wisdom of a system that permits such a result must be
carefully scrutinized. 142 The tenor of the appellate opinions does not, however,
indicate that the courts grasp the very real conundrum created in this situation. 143
136. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE COG. & Abram. NEws
5963, 6179.
137. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the critical need for financing that most Chapter
I I debtors have.
138. In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). For a discussion of the
application of this requirement, see Tabb, supra note 5, at 163.
139. The facts in Ellingsen, see supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text, illustrate this dilemma. The application for
financing was made on Thursday, December 20, with the stated purpose of the requested financing being to enable the
debtor to purchase home heating oil for delivery beginning the next Monday, December 24. The hearing and entry of the
order occurred on Friday, December 21. If the court had stayed its order, the financing would not have been forthcoming
by the next Monday, the debtor could not have purchased home heating oil, the customers for whom the heating oil was
intended allegedly then would be lost to another home heating oil supplier, and the reorganization then would fail. Under
those circumstances it is inconceivable that the bankruptcy court would have stayed the financing order. See Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari at 17 n.15, Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust (In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil
Co.), 56 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1988) (No. 87-1718), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 55 (1988).
140. In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1486-87 (9th Cir. 1987).
141. Id. at 1488-89.
142. The mere fact that a stay is denied does not, however, preclude an appellate court from finding mootness. See,
e.g., Van lperen v. Production Credit Ass'n (In re Van Iperen), 819 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir. 1987); Greylock Glen Corp.
v. Community Say. Bank, 656 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981).
143. Research has not revealed a single case where an emergency financing order granting lender preference clauses
was stayed. In In re First South Say. Ass'n, the Fifth Circuit issued a limited writ of mandamus directing the district court
to issue a stay. In re First South Say. Ass'n, 820 F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir. 1987). The issuance of the stay did not threaten
the reorganization in that case, however, since the requested financing was not urgent. Id. at 705. As discussed above,
a lender preference clause may only be granted in the case of an emergency. See supra notes 79 and 130 and
accompanying text.
The other two elements for the granting of a stay also present serious difficulties for the appellants. The first is that
the appellant show a likelihood of success on the merits. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Since the application
for a stay must be made to the bankruptcy court in the first instance, FED. R. BANR. P. 8005, which court has just granted
the lender preference clause, this requirement obviously is a difficult one for the appellant to satisfy. In effect the appellant
must convince the court that it might have been wrong in granting the order. In re Great Barrington Fair & Amusement,
Inc., 53 Bankr. 237, 239-40 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). Given the potential mootness consequence resulting from the
denial of a stay, however, appellate courts in analogous situations have stated that courts should give very thorough
consideration to the merits of the appellant's stay application. In re Roberts Farms, 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981);
In re Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 192 (9th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, under rule 8005 the stay may
be granted by the bankruptcy appellate panel or the district court if a showing is made as to why relief cannot be obtained
by the bankruptcy court, and mandamus is always a fallback option, as in First South. Such intervention by the appellate
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C. The Implementation of Section 364(e): Assessing the Lender's Good Faith
Even if section 364(e) is held to apply to a nonsection 364 lender preference
clause, contrary to the conclusion in subpart III.A. above, the court still must decide
whether the requirements of section 364(e) are satisfied in the particular case. If they
are, the appeal will be dismissed.t 44 The requirements are, first, that no stay was
obtained and, second, that the lender acted in good faith. Given the standards for
issuance of a stay, it is fair to assume that no stay will ever be obtained. 145 The sole
issue under section 364(e) would therefore be whether the lender extended the credit
in good faith. 146
Two different types of arguments have been made by appealing creditors to
allege bad faith on the part of the lender. One focuses on the substance of the order
itself; the other focuses on alleged procedural abuses by the lender acting in concert
with the debtor in possession. Neither holds much promise for the objecting creditors.
1. Substantive Impropriety
The first type of bad faith argument is based on the substantive provisions of the
order, contending that the lender evinces bad faith by demanding improper
concessions.' 47 Thus, in the leading section 364(e) case, In re EDC Holding
courts will be forthcoming, however, only in the most extreme cases, given the normal deference to lower courts on
matters entrusted to their discretion. See Wymer v. Vymer (In re Wymer), 5 Bankr. 802, 807-08 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1980);
id. at 808-12 (George, J., concurring). In First South, the Fifth Circuit found the facts and the law on the merits to be
overwhelming so as to establish a clear abuse of discretion. First South, 820 F.2d at 709-15.
The second element for the granting of a stay is whether the movant has made a showing of irreparable injury if the
stay is not granted. In First South, the movant argued that the mootness that would result from an application of § 364(e)
constituted such irreparable injury. Although the Fifth Circuit did not decide directly the merits of this contention, they
apparently did give it some credence, noting "the significance of the fact that... an appeal... would likely be rendered
moot." Id. at 709 n. 11. Some courts, on the other hand, have suggested that the irreparable injury requirement must
contemplate something more than the fact that the appeal would be mooted. Otherwise, those courts argue, the exception
would swallow up the mootness rule, and the discretionary stay in essence would be converted into a stay as of right.
Great Barrington, 53 Bankr. at 240; In re Baldwin United Corp., 45 Bankr. 385, 386 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984). The view
taken by these cases is unduly narrow. Recognizing the potential harm of mootness to objecting creditors as a sufficient
injury for the second element of the stay test does not mean that a stay always must be granted. The court still must weigh
all of the requisite elements. Recognizing mootness as a sufficient injury instead prevents the objecting creditor from
automatically losing the application for a stay.
144. See In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d
1484, 1488-91 (9th Cir. 1987); 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (1982).
145. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
146. See Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605; Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1489; In re Graphic Arts Lithographers, 71 Bankr.
774, 776 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987).
147. See, e.g., Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605; Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1490; In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945,
948 (7th Cir. 1982); Graphic Arts, 71 Bankr. at 777.
The courts disagree as to the proper appellate standard of review for addressing the good faith issue in the context
of lender preference clauses. The Sixth Circuit in Ellingsen stated that good faith is a question of fact, limiting review of
a trial court finding of good faith to the very deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a). While
this approach might be proper with regard to a good faith issue involving possible notice deficiencies, the better approach
in the context of a bad faith attack predicated on the alleged improper substance of the order is that of the Ninth Circuit
in Adams Apple. That court recognized that the issue was primarily one of law-whether the lender preference clauses
were illegal per se-and accordingly the appellate court had much more discretion to review the merits of the good faith
finding. Ellingsen, 829 F.2d at 1490 n.10. Under the Adams Apple approach, pursuant to the theory of EDC Holding, see
infra note 151, a court convinced that lender preference clauses are illegal per se might be able to find bad faith.
As the courts have noted, good faith is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605; Adams
Apple, 829 F.2d at 1489; Graphic Arts, 71 Bankr. at 776. Courts have borrowed the "honesty in fact" standard from the
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Company,148 the portion of the priority loan by the bank alleged by the creditors'
committee to be in bad faith was, by the terms of the loan agreement itself, ultimately
to be paid to the attorneys of the debtor's union for attorneys' fees incurred in
litigation against the bankruptcy estate. The appealing creditors' committee had not
obtained a stay of the order pending appeal, and the district court had held the appeal
to be moot under section 364(e). 149 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
lender acted in bad faith, that the appeal was not moot, and that the objectionable
portion of the order should be stricken.150
The key point for the Seventh Circuit was that the lender knew the money was
to be used for a clearly illegal purpose.1 51 Judge Posner for the court stated, "If the
lender knows his priority is invalid but proceeds anyway in the hope that a stay will
not be sought or if sought will not be granted, we cannot see how he can be thought
to be acting in good faith." 5 2 The court further elaborated that a lender will not be
protected "[w]here it is evident from the loan agreement itself that the transaction has
an intended effect that is improper under the Bankruptcy Code."'' 5 3 In contrast, the
court said that section 364(e) would protect a lender who believed that the priority
sought would be valid but who could not be sure given the likelihood of appellate
objections. 154 The crucial distinction, then, appears to be the certainty the lender has
as to the illegality of the transaction.
The lender preference cases have distinguished EDC Holding on two bases. The
first has to do with the purpose for which the funds will be used, the second with the
state of mind of the lender. The focus should remain on the latter to ensure that the
proper questions are being asked and answered.
In EDC Holding, the funds advanced were to be used for the improper purpose
of paying a union's attorneys' fees.15 5 In lender preference cases, on the other hand,
courts have given considerable weight to the fact that the funds are being advanced
for the unquestionably proper purpose of providing operating capital for the
reorganizing debtor. 156 The relevant issue in deciding whether an appeal should be
dismissed under section 364(e) is not the propriety of the intended use of the money,
however, but whether the lender extended the credit in good faith. The appellate court
Uniform Commercial Code to define good faith. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605. However, whatever the supposed standard
is probably will not make much difference, because any formulation necessarily must be vague and conclusory, adding
little to the general concept of good faith.
148. 676 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1982).
149. See id. at 946-47 for a discussion of the facts.
150. Id. at 948-49.
151. Id. at 947-48. EDC Holding's rationale arguably could be applied to lender preference clauses, since the
illegality in that case involved giving a priority payment to parties not entitled to such priority under the terms of the Code.
Such a rearranging of priorities, of course, is the essence of lender preference clauses. See supra note 6.
152. In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 948.
154. Id. at 947.
155. Id. at 946-48. The contested part of the loan was to be used to pay the legal fees of the debtor's union which
had been incurred by the union in litigation against the estate. Such a payment is impermissible under the bankruptcy laws.
Id. at 946, 948.
156. In re Graphic Arts Lithographers, 71 Bankr. 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 65
Bankr. 358, 364 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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considering a section 364(e) question is not deciding whether to approve financing, 157
but whether to protect the lender. This depends on the lender's purposes, activities,
and state of mind. It should be possible for a lender to lend funds for a proper purpose
but still be in bad faith. A failure to recognize this possibility skews the appellate
court's decision as to the lender's good faith.
The proper question is whether a lender who lends postpetition with the avowed
purpose of potentially enhancing its prepetition secured or unsecured position at the
expense of general unsecured creditors via lender preference clauses is lending in
good faith. EDC Holding suggests that the answer to this question depends upon
whether the lender knows with certainty that the lender preference clauses are
improper. Using this analysis, the lender preference cases uniformly have held that
the lender is not acting in bad faith. 158 The reasoning followed is that since some prior
lower court cases have approved lender preference clauses, a subsequent lender
seeking to include such clauses in its financing order cannot know with certainty that
the clauses are illegal, and thus is not acting in bad faith. 159
The foregoing analysis applies even if the reviewing court itself believes that the
clauses are improper. For the purposes of the case before it, the court has no choice
but to say that the lender is not acting in bad faith by asking for a benefit other courts
have granted. This means that the mootness holdings will continue to snowball based
on even a single earlier case allowing any particular lender preference clause. The
only way to stop the snowball effect is for an appellate court, while holding the appeal
in the particular case moot under the foregoing analysis, to go on to state in dictum
that it believes lender preference clauses are illegal per se.160 Then, any lender in that
court's jurisdiction lending money after that opinion would not be able to sustain a
good faith showing with regard to a lender preference clause under the EDC Holding
approach because it would know that the clauses were illegal in that jurisdiction. 161
157. In deciding whether to approve financing orders courts traditionally have considered the propriety of the
debtor's intended use of the money lent. See Baker, supra note 49, at 35; Tondel & Scott, supra note 49, at 22.
158. See In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d
1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987); Graphic Arts, 71 Bankr. at 777.
159. This argument originally was made by the district court in Ellingsen, 65 Bankr. at 364, and that reasoning then
was followed in the subsequent opinions in Graphic Arts, 71 Bankr. at 777, and Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1490, and by
the Sixth Circuit in Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605. See supra note 44.
160. Bankruptcy Judge Babitt in Texlon held that he had to sustain the order, but gave notice that he would not
approve such clauses in the future. In re Texlon Corp., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1013, 1017 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1979). An appellate court may be reluctant to issue such an advisory
opinion.
161. The lender would respond that the court's prior statement was just dictum and that regardless there was a good
faith hope of overturning the opinion in an appellate court. Once the law had been clearly stated to the contrary in that
jurisdiction, however, the lender seeking disapproved benefits should have to take the chance of a merit review on appeal
and should not be entitled to have the appeal dismissed under § 364(e).
Of course, the contrary is also true, If an appellate court in a jurisdiction holds or states in dictum that lender
preference clauses are permissible, then any lender in that jurisdiction should be entitled to rely on that opinion
conclusively to establish the lender's good faith as against substantive attacks. Procedural attacks on the lender's good
faith, discussed in subpart IIl.C.2., still would be possible.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2. Procedural Irregularities
Establishing that seeking a lender preference clause does not in and of itself
constitute bad faith, as discussed in the preceding subpart, should not conclude the
good faith inquiry. Unfortunately, some courts have stopped at this juncture. 162 The
courts should instead be receptive to arguments that a lender who has participated
with the debtor in procedural irregularities in obtaining the financing order has acted
in bad faith. 163 Two types of procedural abuse arguments may be made.
First, the lender's misrepresentation to the court of the existence of the
substantive prerequisites to the granting of a particular type of security or priority to
the lender might establish bad faith. Bankruptcy courts do not like lender preference
clauses, 164 even though sometimes effectively forced to grant them. 165 Those clauses
are only granted, however, if the court believes it has no choice if the reorganization
is to be salvaged.166 If the lender knows that alternatives to financing on a preferential
basis do exist, but seeks the lender preference clause without disclosing that fact to
the court, the lender probably should be considered to have acted in bad faith. 167 The
protections of section 364(e) then would not be available to such a lender.' 68 The
courts have not policed against this type of potential misconduct in the lender
preference context, however.169
Lenders, of course, will be concerned about allowing inquiry on hindsight into
such subjective matters. The only alternative, however, is an absolute rule of
protection. Misrepresentation has long been a basis for giving relief from a
judgment, 170 and no reason exists for having a more protective rule in the appellate
context under section 364(e).171 Furthermore, the difficulty of proving such knowl-
162. See, e.g., In re Graphic Arts Lithographers, 71 Bankr. 774, 777 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987).
163. An attempt to avoid the mootness provisions of § 364(e) by proving procedural abuse arguments is not limited
to lender preference clauses. Any financing order, even one clearly within the letter and spirit of § 364, is subject to attack
on the ground of procedural deficiencies. Procedural abuse arguments also may be made in the context of motions for
relief from the judgment, discussed in Part IV infra.
164. The prominent Vanguard case, which established the generally accepted guidelines for approving cross-
collateralization clauses, see supra note 79, stated that "cross-collateralization is a disfavored means of financing." In
re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
165. See supra Part I1 and notes 69 and 89 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 79 for the requirements for granting cross-collateralization clauses established by Vanguard.
167. See Bohm, supra note 20, at 311-12 n.76. See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text. For example, a
cross-collateralization clause should be granted only if, among other things, the debtor proves that no alternative financing
could be obtained on acceptable terms and that the lender would not accede to less preferential terms. Vanguard, 31
Bankr. at 366. Suppose the lender in fact would have lent the money even without the cross-collateralization clause, but
testified in court that it would not lend without such a clause. Alternatively, assume that the lender knew that the debtor
could obtain financing from a new lender, but insisted, as a condition to its cooperation in the Chapter 11 case, that it be
allowed to do the Chapter I 1 lending, with the hope of improving the status of its unsecured prepetition claims via a lender
preference clause. In these hypothetical cases the lender could be held to have acted in bad faith.
168. In addition, such activity constitutes misrepresentation or fraud sufficient to warrant relief from the judgment
under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text; Bohm, supra note 20, at 311-12 n.76.
169. As discussed earlier, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, the lender in Adams Apple apparently insisted
on the Chapter 11 filing and then obtained a cross-collateralization clause even though other potential lenders might have
been available. In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit did not even raise the
question of whether the lender had participated in a misrepresentation of the necessary requisites of cross-collateralization
to the bankruptcy court so as to forfeit § 364(e) protection.
170. FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b)(3).
171. Indeed, to the extent the concern is with undermining the finality of the financing order, one should be more
concerned about attacks on the judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which may come as late as a year or more after
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edge on the part of the lender would insulate all but the most flagrant cases of abuse.
A per se rule of protection does not seem necessary to further any legitimate aim of
the lender or the bankruptcy system. The appellate courts in deciding the good faith
issue thus should at least be open to allegations of what essentially amounts to a
lender-debtor conspiracy to circumvent the substantive requirements for approval of
lender preference clauses.
The second procedural argument made in an attempt to establish the lender's bad
faith is that the lender participated with the debtor in obtaining the financing order
without giving sufficient notice to creditors. 72 The notice problem pervades the
financing context and accordingly will be discussed in detail in Part V below. That
Part will argue that lenders should be subjected to greater scrutiny than is exercised
at present with regard to notice inadequacies.
IV. DESTROYING FINALITY: BANKRUPTCy COURT REVISION OF FINAL ORDERS
A. The Inexplicable Resurrection of the Administrative Order Doctrine
Part 1I examined how appellate courts have been destroying unjustifiably the
appealability of lender preference clauses, thereby permitting lenders to enjoy the
benefits of those possibly illegal clauses without appellate scrutiny. Some courts have
taken the opposite extreme and have vacated their own earlier grants of those
clauses. 17 3 Unfortunately, courts doing so have been destroying finality in the
process, since the retraction of the lender's preferences by the bankruptcy court has
come after the time for filing an appeal has expired. 174 This disregard of finality has
been justified erroneously by the invocation of the discarded "administrative order"
doctrine.175 Subpart IV.A. explains that modification of a final financing order, even
one containing lender preference clauses, should only be done pursuant to the strict
requirements of rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 176 and not
thejudgment is entered, than about appeals, which usually must be filed within 10 days of the entry of the judgment. FED.
R. BAmm. P. 8002(a).
172. See, e.g., In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 549, 605 (6th Cir. 1987).
173. See Otte v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1100-01 (2d Cir.
1979); In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 862 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). The court in In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr.
833, 839 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985), stated in dicta that it had authority to consider out of time a motion to reconsider a
financing order containing a cross-collateralization clause. The lender in that case had agreed, however, that the initial
order would not be final, but would instead be subject to approval at a subsequent full hearing. Id.
174. An appeal must be filed within 10 days of the entry of the order being appealed from, FED. R. BANKr. P.
8002(a), although an extension for up to 20 days may be granted within the original 10-day period. Id. at R. 8002(c). In
Terlon, the financing order was entered on November 1, 1974. The motion to modify the order was made on January 16,
1975. Texlon, 596 F.2d at 1094-95. In Monach, the financing order was entered on October 8, 1982, while the motion
for reconsideration was filed in February 1984. Monach, 41 Bankr. at 860.
175. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides the grounds for relief from a final judgment:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
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pursuant to the administrative order doctrine. Subpart IV.B. then applies rule 60(b)
to the financing order context to determine when relief might be granted under that
rule.
The leading case ignoring principles of finality to take away a lender preference
clause is Texlon, 177 discussed briefly in the Introduction. 178 In that case, lender
preference clauses were granted in an exparte financing order entered on the very day
that the Chapter XI petition was filed. Long after the time for filing an appeal of that
order had expired, and after the case had been converted to a Chapter VII liquidation,
the bankruptcy trustee asked the bankruptcy court to modify its original financing
order to eliminate the lender's preferences. 179 The bankruptcy court refused to alter
its order because of that order's finality. 180
The Second Circuit surprisingly held on appeal that the bankruptcy judge had
the power to modify its earlier order pursuant to the ancient bankruptcy doctrine
regarding "administrative orders," despite finding that relief was not warranted
under rule 60(b).181 The administrative order doctrine allows the revision of
bankruptcy administrative orders at any time, as long as no rights have vested in
reliance on the order.182 Since the lender had been repaid in full for the postpetition
loans made, the Texion court held that the lender did not lose any vested rights by
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. BANKRt. P. 9024 applies rule 60(b) to bankruptcy cases, subject to a few delineated exceptions not relevant
to the issues considered in this Article. This incorporation follows the lead of rule 9024's predecessor, FED. R. BANKt.
P. 924 (1973) (repealed 1983). With regard to the decision to adopt the Federal Rules generally to bankruptcy practice,
see Fed. R. Bankr. P. Adv. Comm. Introductory Note 16 (1973).
Rule 60(b), which provides a comprehensive listing of grounds for obtaining relief from a final judgment, see Fan.
R. Civ. P. 60(b) (Adv. Comm. Note 1946) ("It is obvious that the rules should be complete in this respect and define the
practice with respect to any existing rights or remedies to obtain relief from final judgments."), is designed to
accommodate the conflicting policies of giving finality to judgments but also of correcting unjust judgments. See
Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CAUF. L. REV. 531, 533 (1972) [hereinafter Rule
60(b) Survey].
177. Texlon, 596 F.2d at 1092.
178. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
179. The facts are discussed at Texlon 596 F.2d at 1094-95. The time delay in seeking the reconsideration was
approximately two and one-half months. See supra note 174.
180. In re Texlon Corp., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1013, 1017 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 596 F.2d 1092 (2d
Cir. 1979).
181. Texlon, 596 F.2d at 1100-01.
182. See 2A ColYtR ON BANKRIurcy, supra note 49, 39.18, at 1489-92 (14th ed. 1978). "Administrative orders"
are those orders addressing general administrative matters involved in the bankruptcy administration which are not
necessarily adversarial, and which are thus entered initially "in the absence of adversary parties 'informally and without
notice or hearing.'" Id. at 1489. Common examples are orders allowing compensation to attorneys or directing the
surrender of exempt or burdensome property. Id. at 1490. The leading cases are Pfister v. Northern Ill. Fin. Corp., 317
U.S. 144 (1942), see infra note 194, and Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131 (1937), which
stated the doctrine in terms of a broad inherent authority of the bankruptcy court. See infra note 193. Numerous cases prior
to Texlon also had followed the basic principle of those two Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Feldman v. Trans-East Air,
Inc., 497 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1974); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Skutt, 341 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1965); Federal
Land Bank v. Hansen, 113 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1940).
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modification of the order. 183 The promise of additional preferential treatment for the
lender's prepetition claim was not considered a protectable vested right.1 8 4
Unfortunately, Texlon is the leading case on the issue and has been followed by
a number of courts. 185 The Texion court's resurrection of the administrative order
doctrine as a basis for granting relief from judgments outside of rule 60(b) was
erroneous.' 8 6 This mistaken invocation of the administrative order doctrine virtually
eliminates the concept of finality in bankruptcy, thereby causing several pernicious
effects. Reorganizations may be threatened if people cannot do business with the
debtor with the assurance that benefits granted to them will be honored once the time
for appeal has expired. 187 The integrity of the bankruptcy system and of the judicial
process is undermined by post hoc re-evaluations of orders many months or even
years after those orders are entered. Furthermore, the development of the substantive
bankruptcy law, particularly important with regard to lender preference clauses
because of the current debate over their validity, is facilitated by the early resolution
of disputed issues on appeal.
On a more basic level, however, the propriety of applying finality principles in
bankruptcy is not even an issue. The Supreme Court has decreed that the same finality
principles applicable to civil proceedings generally also apply to bankruptcy
proceedings, subject to a few carefully delineated exceptions tailored to particular
bankruptcy situations. This decision, embodied in the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules of
Procedure extant at the time of the Texlon decision, has been carried forward in
subsequent revisions of the Bankruptcy Rules, and is implemented in several places
in the current Bankruptcy Rules.188
183. Texton, 596 F.2d at 1101. The Monach court scheduled a hearing to determine whether the lender was entitled
to a lien or priority for the money lent pursuant to the financing order. In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 862
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). in Montco, Inc. v. Barr (In re Emergency Beacon Corp.), 666 F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir. 1981),
a leading case involving relief under rule 60(b) from a certificate of indebtedness, the court found that the lender had not
changed its position in reliance on the order granting the certificate. In Bill Roderick Distrib. v. AJ. Mackay Co. (In re
A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 Bankr. 756, 760 (D. Utah 1985), the court invoked its equitable powers to permit modification of
a confirmed reorganization plan, but remanded to the bankruptcy court with instructions to take appropriate steps to
protect the reliance of the debtor's principal on the order confirming the plan.
184. The court stated the test to be "whether ... the court will be able to reestablish the rights of the opposing party
as they stood when the original judgment was rendered." In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1101 (2d Cir. 1979). This
test does not regard as protectable prejudice any expectation of an increased profit on the prepetition claim. See Tabb,
supra note 5, at 144-45; see supra notes 62 and 76-78 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
186. This conclusion is shared by Bohm, supra note 20, at 306-07, and Ordin, supra note 20, at 175-76, who also
argue for the substantive validity of cross-collateralization. See Bohm, supra note 20, at 294-305; Ordin, supra note 20,
at 176-80. As discussed in detail in this Article, I believe the issues of substantive validity and procedural protection are
distinct and that confusion can result from a failure to separate the two.
187. See Ordin, supra note 20, at 176.
188. As stated earlier, see supra note 176, FED. R. BAMsKi. P. 9024, following the lead of prior FED. R. BANKi. P.
924 (1973) (repealed 1983), incorporates FED. R. Civ. P. 60, granting more liberal rights of relief from orders than
contained in rule 60 only with regard to motions to reopen a case or to reconsider a claim. Complaints to revoke a Chapter
7 discharge or to revoke a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 13 confirmation must be filed within the statutory time limits specified
by the applicable Code sections. FaD. R. BANKR. P. 9024(2), 9024(3). The impact of rule 9024's promulgation on the
administrative order doctrine will be discussed shortly. See infra notes 189-204 and accompanying text. FED. R. BANKR.
P. 9023, again excepting only motions to reconsider claims, incorporates FED. R. Civ. P. 59, which provides that motions
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment must be served not later than 10 days after the entry of a judgment. A
judgment is effective when entered, pursuant to FED. R. BANKR. P. 9021, and rule 9022 requires service of a notice of
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The Texlon court's resurrection of the administrative order doctrine in 1979 is
particularly puzzling in light of the following language in the 1973 Advisory
Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 924 (the predecessor to current rule 9024):
"These rules do not preserve the features of the practice pertaining to so-called
'administrative orders,' which have been regarded as subject at any time to
reconsideration by the referee or to review by the district court without regard to the
limitations of [section] 39c of the Act."18 9 The Advisory Committee Note also stated
that "the limitations prescribed by Rule 60(b) on the availability of relief by motion
from a judgment or order are now entirely appropriate in bankruptcy cases." 190
Leading bankruptcy commentators have understood the foregoing language to mean
exactly what it says: that relief from all types of bankruptcy judgments or orders,
whether those orders are informal, nonadversarial and "administrative," or formal
judgments in adversary proceedings, may only be obtained pursuant to rule 60.191
The Texlon court, despite its awareness of the Advisory Committee Note to rule
924,192 held that the administrative order doctrine survived the promulgation of rule
924 for at least two reasons. First, the court stated that rule 924 had not overruled the
two principal Supreme Court cases, decided in 1937193 and 1942,194 that had
entry of a judgment on contesting parties and on others as directed by the court, but makes clear that any failure to give
this notice does not affect the requirements for filing an appeal, except as noted in the rules specifically governing appeals.
The appellate rules contained in Part VIII of the Bankruptcy Rules further show the Supreme Court's decision to
equate bankruptcy practice with civil practice with regard to finality and reviewability. Rules 8001 and 8002 make clear
that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute prerequisite to the maintenance of the appeal. Indeed, the standard
period of time for filing the notice of appeal is only 10 days, as opposed to 30 days for regular civil actions. Id. R. 8002(a).
The Advisory Committee Note to rule 8002 explains that "[the shortened time is specified in order to obtain prompt
appellate review, often important to the administration of a case under the Code." Id. R. 8002 (Adv. Comm. Note 1987).
The advantages supposedly flowing from such speedy action would be undermined by a rule freely permitting out of time
modifications.
189. FED. R. BArNK. P. 924 (Adv. Comm. Note 1973).
190. Id.
191. See 9 COuT E ON BANKouTrcy, supra note 49, T 9024.06, at 9024-7 (interpreting rule 9024: "The Bankruptcy
Rules have abolished the distinction by which administrative orders were regarded as subject to review at any time without
regard to the limitations of Section 39c of the former Bankruptcy Act. Relief from judgments and orders, whether the
result of an adversary proceeding or not, are now subject to the limitations set out in Rule 60 as adopted by Bankruptcy
Rule 9024."); see also 13 Cot.stER ON BArKRupTcy, supra note 49, 924.05, at 9-136 (14th ed. 1977) (similarly
interpreting rule 924, the predecessor to present rule 9024); Ordin, supra note 20, at 175.
192. In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1101 (2d Cir. 1979).
193. Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131 (1937). In Wayne, a petition for
reorganization under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act was dismissed by the district court on March 2, 1936. No appeal was
properly filed within the 30 days allowed by the Bankauptey Act, and thereafter, on April 24, a petition for rehearing of
the dismissal order was filed with the district court. The district court granted the petition for rehearing, heard the case
on the merits, and again dismissed the petition for reorganization. A timely appeal from this second dismissal order was
taken, but the Fourth Circuit held that the district court was without power to rehear the petition, that the first dismissal
thus controlled, and that the appeal from the second dismissal must be dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the district court as the court of bankruptcy had the equitable discretion to rehear the petition for reorganization even
after the time for appeal of the first order of dismissal had expired, and that the time for appeal then must be counted from
the second dismissal. Id. at 135-38. The Court stated that the bankruptcy "court has the power, for good reason, to revise
its judgments upon seasonable application and before rights have vested on the faith of its action." Id. at 137.
194. Pfister v. Northern I1. Fin. Corp., 317 U.S. 144 (1942). See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text for
a critique of the Texlon court's application of Pfister. Pfister dealt with a slightly different situation than Wayne and
extended the rule of Wayne, that the trial court has power to hear untimely motions for rehearing, to state that an appellate
court has power to hear untimely appeals, a completely different issue. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
The farmer debtor had filed for an Agricultural Composition and Extension under § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, and the
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established the administrative order doctrine, since the Advisory Committee Note did
not specifically refer to those cases by name. 195 Second, a General Order in
Bankruptcy applying the Federal Rules to bankruptcy cases 196 was in force at the time
of the 1942 decision, Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corporation. 197 The court's
argument apparently was that if general order 37 did not preclude application of the
administrative order doctrine, then neither did rule 924, because each incorporated
rule 60 into bankruptcy practice.
The first and strongest response to the Texlon court's arguments is that, as
discussed above, the 1973 Advisory Committee Note to rule 924 unambiguously
declared that the administrative order doctrine no longer applied in bankruptcy. 198
Why a reference to particular case names would be required in addition to a reference
to the principles of those cases is entirely unclear. Furthermore, in 1973 the
Bankruptcy Rules, including of course rule 924, controlled inconsistent statutory
provisions' 99 and necessarily then also controlled judicially developed bankruptcy
procedural doctrines. The Rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court itself,
which had decided the earlier cases.
The Texlon court's cryptic reference to the Pfister case and general order 37,
explained above, is off base for several reasons. First, the Pfister court held that the
appellate court had the power to consider out of time petitions.2 °  Texlon used that
case as authority to hold that the trial court itself had the power, 20' an entirely
different matter.
Second, even the specific holding of Pfister is no longer good law. Pfister held
that section 39c, which provided that a petition for review of a bankruptcy referee's
order must be filed within ten days, did not limit the power of the reviewing court202
conciliation commissioner (the equivalent of today's bankruptcy judge for purposes of the procedural analysis) entered
certain orders in that case. After the expiration of the 10-day time period specified in Act § 39c for appeal to the district
court (called a "petition for review"), a petition for rehearing of the original orders by the commissioner was sought.
Unlike Wayne, see supra note 193, the petition for rehearing was denied, and appeal then was sought within 10 days.
Pfister, 317 U.S. at 145-47. The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time for appeal
ran from the entry of the original order, since the petition for rehearing had been denied. Id. at 151. However, the Court
clarified the basis for the dismissal. The district court thought that it was without power to entertain the appeal, given the
expiration of the time for filing the petition for review. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did in fact
have the power to hear the untimely appeal, thus extending the Wayne doctrine: "The entire process of rehabilitation,
reorganization or liquidation is open to reexamination out of time by the District Court, in its discretion, and subject to
intervening rights." Id. at 152. The 10-day time limit of § 39c was interpreted as a limitation on the right of the "person
aggrieved" to obtain review and not as a limit on the appellate court's power to entertain untimely appeals. Id. at 152-53;
see infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. However, the Court then held that the facts would have supported a
dismissal by the district court if that court had exercised its discretion as to whether to hear the untimely appeal, and thus
the dismissal should be affirmed. Pfister, 317 U.S. at 153-54.
195. Texion, 596 F.2d at 1101.
196. General Order in Bankruptcy 37, promulgated 305 U.S. 677, 698 (1939). General Orders in Bankruptcy were
promulgated by the Supreme Court and regulated practice and procedure in bankruptcy cases until the promulgation by
the Court of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 1973.
197. 317 U.S. 144 (1942). See Texlon, 596 F.2d at 1100 n.9, 1101.
198. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
199. See Pub. L. No. 88-623, 78 Stat. 1001 (1964) (28 U.S.C. § 2075 was amended in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92 Stat. 2672 (1978), to give statutes priority over conflicting rules.)
200. Pfister v. Northern Il. Fin. Corp., 317 U.S. 144, 151-53 (1942); see supra note 194.
201. In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1979).
202. The reviewing court in Pfister was the district court. Pfister, 317 U.S. at 147; see supra note 194. The district
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to hear the matter in its discretion at any time, but instead was only "a limitation on
the 'person aggrieved' to file such petition as a matter of right. "203 On the contrary,
the current appellate rules found in Part VIII of the Bankruptcy Rules make clear that
a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the appellate court hearing
the appeal. 2° 4
Texion has generated substantial confusion. 205 Several cases erroneously have
cited the rule of the two early Supreme Court cases relied upon by Texlon as well as
Texlon itself as synonymous with the provisions of current Bankruptcy Rule 9024.206
Many other cases cite Texion as blanket authority for the bankruptcy court to modify
a final order at any time. 20 7 Numerous courts persist in stating that the administrative
order doctrine provides a basis independent of rule 9024 for the bankruptcy court to
modify its orders. 20 8 Fortunately, however, the post-Texlon circuit court opinions,
including one in the Second Circuit, reflect a subtle pulling back from the Texlon
rationale, with those courts stating that the bankruptcy court's power to modify its
own orders now is found exclusively in rule 9024.209 If this is true, as the foregoing
court sat as the "court of bankruptcy," and appointed the conciliation commissioner in § 75 Agricultural Extension and
Composition cases. Pfister, 317 U.S. at 145 n.l.
203. Id. at 153. See supra note 194.
204. Montco, Inc. v. Barr (In re Emergency Beacon Corp.), 666 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1981). Several other
reasons exist for rejecting the Texlon court's invocation of Pfister. The Pfister court did not consider at all the possible
effect of rule 60 (via general order 37), but instead focused solely on the effect of Act § 39c. Pfister, 317 U.S. at 148-53.
Second, even if the Court had considered the effect of rule 60(b) in Pfister, it would have been considering a rule
fundamentally different from the one in force today and at the time Texon was decided, since rule 60(b) was changed in
1946 to cover inclusively the grounds for obtaining relief from a final judgment. See 7 MooPa's FEDERAL PRACTcE
60.18[8], at 60-145 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MooRE].
205. Although most courts have followed Texlon blindly, see infra note 207 and accompanying text, some courts
have recognized the confusion created by Texlon as to whether the administrative order doctrine continues to have validity
independent of rule 60(b). See, e.g., In re Shaffer, 8 Bankr. 497, 500 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
206. SeeIn re Klein, 58 Bankr. 816, 818-19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833, 839 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1985); Georgia Steel, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank (In re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 790, 794
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982) (court read Texion as having been decided under rule 60(b); the Second Circuit in fact expressly
rejected rule 60(b) as a basis for relief, see In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1979)). The district
court in Bill Roderick Distrib. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 Bankr. 756,760-61 (D. Utah 1985), read
Wayne as being overruled by Bankruptcy Rule 8002 (which sets the time period for filing an appeal), but nevertheless
stated that the principle of Wayne still survives.
207. Big Shanty Land Corp. v. Comer Properties, 61 Bankr. 272, 283 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Mackay, 50 Bankr. at
759-60; In re Featherworks Corp., 36 Bankr. 460, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Futuronics Corp., 5 Bankr. 489, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Nordyke (In re Nordyke), 43 Bankr. 856, 860-61 (Bankr. D. Ore.
1984); Georgia Steel, 25 Bankr. at 794; Shaffer, 8 Bankr. at 500-01; Menna v. Murphy (In re Murphy), I Bankr. 736,
738 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1979); Flushing Say. Bank v. Parr (In re Parr), 1 Bankr. 453, 455 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979).
208. See, e.g., Mackay, 50 Bankr. at 759; Futuronics, 5 Bankr. at 498; Shaffer, 8 Bankr. at 500. A number of cases
citing a similar principle trace their lineage not through Wayne or Pfister but instead through Central 11. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co. (In re Pottasch Bros.), 79 F.2d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1935). See Brielle Assoc. v. Graziano, 685 F.2d 109, 111-12
& n. I (3d Cir. 1982) (involving reconsideration of claims and stating that the bankruptcy court has inherent authority to
reconsider a disallowed claim and is not dependent on Bankruptcy Rule 307, which conferred a similar power); In re Lintz
West Side Lumber, 655 F.2d 786, 789, 791 (7th Cir. 1981) (involving modification of an abandonment order). Authors
of these and other decisions are particularly fond of quoting the following language from Potasch: "Why it is desirable
that their orders [referring to referees, the predecessors to bankruptcy judges], ruat coelum, should be as immutable as
the Twelve Tables, once the ink is dry, we cannot understand." Pottasch, 79 F.2d at 616. The case itself, however,
merely decides that referees have the same power as a district judge to modify their orders. At the time the case was
decided, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not been adopted, and the power of modification had not been
incorporated into rules 59 and 60, as they are today for district judges and bankruptcy judges alike.
209. In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 1985) (motion to vacate sale order, court stated that
"the long delay of the trustee in presenting his claim is relevant to the pre-Rule 924 compelling equities theory, but in
light of Rule 9024 it is more appropriate to address the delay issue by direct reference to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)") (citations
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discussion argues, then Texlon is wrong, and the administrative order doctrine is
dead. Unfortunately, not all district courts and bankruptcy courts have fully
understood this subtle disavowal of Texlon, and they continue instead to follow its
holding. 210
A final reason exists for concluding that the administrative order doctrine no
longer applies. The 1973 Bankruptcy Rules sought "to emphasize the judicial in
contradistinction to the ministerial functions of the referee in bankruptcy adminis-
tration and to enhance the dignity of the office as that of the principal judge of the
bankruptcy court." 211 This purpose was consistent with the recommendation in the
Bankruptcy Commission Report issued the same year, 21 2 a recommendation strongly
endorsed and implemented in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. 2 13 The nationwide
implementation of the United States Trustee system in 1986214 cemented the
separation of the administrative and judicial functions, with the bankruptcy judge
now to function as just that, a judge. Such a role is inconsistent in theory and in
practice with the administrative, supervisory role of the judge which the administra-
tive order doctrine would necessitate.
B. The Limited Availability of Relief Under Rule 60(b)
If Texlon's invocation of the administrative order doctrine is abandoned, it will
be evident that, apart from appeal, relief from a final financing order should only be
granted pursuant to the provisions of rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 215 This subpart explores the potentially appropriate bases under rule 60(b)
omitted); In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1981) (after citing the Texion rule, the Second
Circuit states "[w]e agree with this result in light of the powers granted the bankruptcy judge by Bankruptcy Rule 924"
and further that "t]he amenability of a final order to modification by the bankruptcy court itself, however, is governed
by Bankruptcy Rule 924, which incorporates Fed. R. Civ. P. 60"); Taylor v. Lake (In re Cada Investments), 664 F.2d
1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981) (after quoting Wayne, the court states "[t]bis power is now formalized in Bankruptcy Rule 924,
which makes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 applicable to bankruptcy cases .... "). See also Bialac v. Harsh
Investment Corp. (In re Bialac), 694 F.2d 625, 627 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (court in text noted that "a bankruptcy court has
wide latitude to reconsider and vacate its own prior decisions," and then in footnote identified that power as emanating
from FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 60(b)).
210. A review of the lower court decisions after the 1981 opinion in Emergency Beacon, in which the Second
Circuit stated clearly that rule 60(b) provided the sole basis for relief, see supra note 209, indicates that those courts have
not fully adopted the reasoning of Emergency Beacon. Most courts have not even cited Emergency Beacon, but instead
have only cited Texion. See Big Shanty, 61 Bankr. at 283; Mackay, 50 Bankr. at 759-60; Featherworks, 36 Bankr. at
462; Klein, 58 Bankr. at 818-19; Nordyke, 43 Bankr. at 860. Other courts have cited both Texion (or Wayne and Pfister)
and Emergency Beacon, apparently believing that those cases stand for the same rule, although differing as to what that
rule is. See, e.g., In re Asusa, 47 Bankr. 928, 930-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stand for general rule of unlimited power of
reconsideration); FCX, 54 Bankr. at 839 (same); Georgia Steel, 25 Bankr. at 794-95 (stand for general rule that relief
is available under rule 60(b)). Some courts have correctly followed Emergency Beacon. See, e.g., In re Flagstaff
Foodservice Corp., 14 Bankr. 462, 464 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (opinion by Judge Babitt, who rendered the bankruptcy
court opinion in Texlon, that finality should have been respected, see supra notes 11 and 180 and accompanying text).
211. 1973 Cotu rE PAmpm.Er EDmON, BANr urcY Acr An RuLEs, Advisory Comm.'s Int. Note to the Prelim.
Draft A-363, A-365.
212. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION  THE BAmupTrCY LAws OF THE UNrrnD STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 5-8 (1973).
213. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-91 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEws 5963, 6051-53.
214. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
215. Rule 60(b) in six separate subsections sets out possible grounds for relief. See supra note 176. Any rule 60(b)
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for granting relief from a financing order containing lender preference clauses: judicial
error,2 16 fraud or misrepresentation by the lender,2 17 and inadequate notice.21 8
Rule 60(b)'s fundamental purpose is to reconcile the sometimes conflicting
principles of finality of judgments and justice in an individual case.2 19 General
statements as to the appropriate standard governing the granting of relief under rule
60(b), which vary,2 2 0 are not very helpful in the abstract, 221 as the bankruptcy court
in each case must exercise its equitable discretion carefully in deciding whether to
overturn a final judgment.22 2 The party seeking relief has the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence some reason for the court to override the baseline policy
favoring repose.22 3 A rule 60(b) motion is not available as an alternative to appeal. 224
Two points of particular relevance to the financing order context may be made.
First, the safe harbor provision of Bankruptcy Code section 364(e), which applies to
appeals,2 25 does not in any way limit the availability of relief under rule 60(b),2 2 6
motion must always be brought within a reasonable time, see In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 697 (7th Cir.
1985); 9 COLLER ON BANRunrcy, supra note 49, 9024.04, at 9024-5 (except for void judgments under 60(b)(4), see
Whitney-Forbes, 770 F.2d at 697; 7 MooRE, supra note 204, 60.25[4], at 60-241; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MIL.ER, FEDERAL
PRAcncE AND PRocEuRE, § 2862, at 197 (1973); or actions predicated upon a "fraud upon the court," see
Whitney-Forbes, 770 F.2d at 698; In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d at 759; Rule 60(b) Survey, supra note 176,
at 532, which may be brought at any time), with an additional one year time limit imposed for motions brought under
subsections (1), (2), and (3). Whitney-Forbes, 770 F.2d at 697; Emergency Beacon, 666 F.2d at 758; In re Asusa, 47
Bankr. 928, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b); Rule 60(b) Survey, supra note 176, at 531. The savings clauses
of rule 60(b) preserve independent actions in equity for relief from the judgment, see 7 MOORE, supra note 204,
60.18[8], at 60-146 to -147, 60.31, at 60-348, and recognize the court's inherent power to set aside any judgment for
fraud upon the court. See id. 60.33, at 60-351. Otherwise, rule 60(b) is intended to state the inclusive grounds for relief.
See supra note 176.
216. See infra notes 229-50 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text and subpart V.D.
219. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Employes' [sic] Retirement Fund v. Durkalec (In re Durkalec), 21
Bankr. 618, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Williams v. Cal Indus. (In re Ireco Indus.), 2 Bankr. 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Ore.
1979); 9 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcy, supra note 49, t 9024.03, at 9024-3, 1 9024.04, at 9024-4 to -5; 7 MOORE, supra note
204, 60.18[8], at 60-138. A study of rule 60(b) concluded that the courts generally were doing a good job of effecting
this reconciliation. Rule 60(b) Survey, supra note 176, at 539.
220. This variation is most noticeable with regard to the catch-all provision, rule 60(b)(6). See infra notes 244-48
and accompanying text.
221. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MeILER, supra note 215, § 2857, at 158-59 (of "limited usefulness").
222. See, e.g., In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Klein, 58 Bankr. 816, 819
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); Emergency Beacon, 48 Bankr. at 362; 7 MooRE, supra note 204, T 60.1818], at 60-140; 11 C.
WRIoH & A. MILLER, supra note 215, § 2857, at 157. The factors typically considered in exercising that discretion are
set out at 7 MOORE, supra note 204, T 60.19, at 60-164 to -166, and at I1 C. VIGTr & A. MILLER, supra note 215,
§ 2857, at 160-62. The only exception to this rule is that a court considering whether to set aside a judgment as void
actually has little or no discretion, its inquiry instead being limited to ascertaining whether or not the judgment in fact is
void, with relief being virtually mandatory if the judgment is found to be void. See 11 C. WVoTrr & A. MuILER, supra
note 215, § 2862, at 197. In the normal case where discretion is exercised, appellate review is predicated on an abuse of
discretion standard. See In re Chung King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1985); Emergency Beacon, 666 F.2d at 760;
First Nat'l Bank v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981); Klein, 58 Bankr. at 819; 7 MOORE, supra
note 204, 160.19, at 60-154; 11 C. WRIGHr & A. MnuTER, supra note 215, § 2857, at 158.
223. See 7 MOORE, supra note 204, T 60.2813], at 60-323 (burden of proof); 11 C. \VRIGr & A. MILR, supra note
215, § 2860, at 189 (standard of proof); 9 Cot.r-s ON BANKRu'rcv, supra note 49, T 9024.05, at 9024-6 ("extraordinary
remedy").
224. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) (rule 60(b)(6) specifically); 7 MooRE, supra note 204,
T 60.18[8], at 60-140 (rule 60(b) generally).
225. See supra subparts III.A. and IU.C.
226. See In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 65 Bankr. 358, 360 n.2, 364 n.6 (W.D. Mich 1986) (dictum); In re
Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 862 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (dictum). The Sixth Circuit in Ellingsen also noted
that the complaining unsecured creditors could have sought relief under rule 60(b) instead of appealing, and that if they
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which applies to motions to the bankruptcy court for relief. Second, the limitations
of rule 60(b) apply only tofinal judgments or orders. 227 Thus, if the bankruptcy judge
enters an interlocutory financing order only because of the exigent circumstances, 228
the court would be free to modify that order at any time unrestricted by rule 60(b).
Unsecured creditors attacking lender preference clauses by a rule 60(b) motion
are likely to allege that the bankruptcy court committed a legal error in approving the
clauses. 229 As noted earlier, the validity of those clauses is an open question, 230 and
even those courts authorizing such clauses do so only in extreme cases. 231 Although
I believe that bankruptcy courts should deny approval to lender preference clauses
initially, 232 once granted those clauses should not be overturned by the bankruptcy
court on the ground of legal error. Relief properly should be granted only on appeal,
not under rule 60(b). However, several rule 60(b) grounds have been asserted to
support relief for judicial error.
Rule 60(b)(1), referring to relief for "mistake," 233 is the most obvious basis for
seeking relief for judicial error. The majority interpretation of that subsection,
properly followed by the Second Circuit in Texlon,234 rejects using rule 60(b)(1) as
a basis for correcting a legal error by the trial court, but instead limits that rule to
cases involving the mistake of the moving party or his attorney. 235 Even minority
approaches allowing some relief for judicial error under rule 60(b)(1) would not
provide solace for objecting creditors in the financing order context.2 36
had done so the barriers of Code § 364(e) would not have applied. In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 604
(6th Cir. 1987).
227. 7 MooRE, supra note 204, 60.26[4], at 60-251, 256. Rule 60(b) on its face states that "the court may relieve
a party... from afnal judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons .... FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis
added).
228. An example is In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833, 839 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986), in which the bankruptcy court
entered the initial financing order only upon the stipulation of the lender that the order would be subject to final approval
at a subsequent, fully noticed hearing. This "two-step" procedure is discussed infra at notes 307, 310, and 329 and
accompanying text.
229. This argument was apparently raised in In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1979), and
has been raised in the § 364(e) context by the creditors in Ellingsen in their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7-12, Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust (In re Ellingsen
Maclean Oil Co.), 56 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1988) (No. 87-1718).
230. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); FCX, 54 Bankr. at
840.
232. See Tabb, supra note 5; supra subpart uI.A.
233. See supra note 176 for the complete text of rule 60(b)(1).
234. In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1100 (2d Cir. 1979).
235. See In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Shaffer, 8 Bankr. 497, 500
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (following Texlon); I1 C. WRnIT & A. MIER, supra note 215, § 2858, at 176-78.
236. Some courts allow relief if the rule 60(b) motion is filed within the time for appeal, see 7 MOORE, supra note
204, 60.2213], at 60-188 to -194, and the leading federal practice commentators cite this as the only defensible basis
for granting relief under rule 60(b)(l) for purely legal error. Id. 60.22[3], at 60-186; 11 C. WIorr & A. Mujaa, supra
note 215, § 2858, at 178-80 (although these authors prefer not giving relief for judicial error under 60(b)(1), see id. at
176-78, on the theory that doing so undermines finality and the procedures for relief under FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). Since
the time for filing an appeal in federal civil litigation is 30 days under the Federal Rules, FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), this
minority approach provides objecting creditors 20 days in addition to the 10 days allowed under FaD. R. CIV. P. 59 for
seeking relief from the trial court. In bankruptcy practice, however, the time for appeal is only 10 days, FEn. R. BAiRa.
P. 8002(a), and this approach thus would not provide any additional relief for objecting creditors to that already allowed
under rule 59, which is incorporated into bankruptcy practice by rule 9023. See supra note 188.
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Nor may a judicial error be corrected pursuant to rule 60(b)(4) 237 as a "void"
judgment. The fact that the bankruptcy court made an error of law, even a gross error,
does not render the judgment void.238 The Second Circuit in Texlon correctly so
held. 239 The scope of rule 60(b)(4) is exceedingly narrow; most orders-are valid and
not void. 240 Generally, the only void orders are those entered outside the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court, or without personal jurisdiction over the parties, or
in violation of due process of law.241 An erroneous order regarding creditor priorities,
the problem raised by lender preference clauses, is still within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court, and does not violate due process unless entered without notice, a
question to be discussed in Part V.
No plausible argument may be made that subsections (2), (3), or (5) of rule 60
apply in the case of judicial error,242 which then leaves only the residual power to
grant relief found in subsection (6).243 Some confusion appears in the bankruptcy
237. See supra note 176 for the complete text of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
238. See In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1985); Texion, 596 F.2d at 1099; In re Emergency
Beacon Corp., 48 Bankr. 356, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Shaffer, 8 Bankr. at 500; 7 MooRs, supra note 204, 60.2513],
at 60-239; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MnI.ER, supra note 215, § 2862, at 198.
239. In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099 (2d Cir. 1979).
240. Whitney-Forbes, 770 F.2d at 696; 7 MooRE, supra note 204, 60.25[2], at 60-225.
241. Whitney-Forbes, 770 F.2d at 696-97; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Center Wholesale, Inc. (In re Center
Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985); Randbre Corp. v. Ladney (In re Randbre Corp.), 66 Bankr. 482,
485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (due process defect alleged); In re Photo Promotion Assoc., 53 Bankr. 759, 761 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (due process defect alleged); Williams v. Cal Indus. (In re Ireco Indus.), 2 Bankr. 76, 82-83 (Bankr.
D. Ore. 1979) (subject matter jurisdiction defect alleged); 7 MooR, supra note 204, 60.2512], at 60-227 to -228
(usurpation), 60-229 (lack of jurisdiction), 60-236 (due process violation); 11 C. WaiGtrr & A. MuER, supra note 215,
§ 2862, at 198-200.
242. Rule 60(b)(2) allows relief in the case of newly discovered evidence, and 60(b)(3) for fraud and other
misconduct, neither of which bears on the issue of giving relief for judicial error. Rule 60(b)(5) applies if "the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." While neither of the first two
(b)(5) bases may apply, the latter ground, regarding the inequity of continuing to give the judgment prospective
application, arguably could support giving relief for judicial error in granting lender preference clauses, since those
clauses typically continue to have a prospective effect, until the prepetition claim is entirely paid. Certainly the rule applies
to any judgment with a prospective effect. See 7 MooRE, supra note 204, 1 60.2614], at 60-256 to -258, -261 to -262;
11 C. NVGr & A. MILLER, supra note 215, § 2863, at 205. However, the rule would not apply to rectify a legal error,
because the sine qua non of the rule is that circumstances must have changed. See id. at 206-07. As the Supreme Court
said in the leading case, "We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting." United States v. Swift & Co.,
286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). In the Chapter 11 financing context, it is unlikely that circumstances would have changed
within the meaning of 60(b)(5) when the disappointed unsecured creditors move to strike the lender preference clauses
previously granted. Indeed, the most likely change of circumstances that would have occurred would be that the lender
would have financed pursuant to the financing order. This change militates against granting relief, because of the arguable
reliance of and change of position by the lender. See supra notes 49-50 and 60-81 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the reliance issue in the § 364(e) context. Bankruptcy courts sometimes are willing to grant rule 60(b)(5)
relief if doing so would facilitate the chances for a reorganization. See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Prime, Inc.
(In re Prime, Inc.), 26 Bankr. 556, 558 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (adequate protection order in favor of secured creditor
modified to protect opportunity for reorganization). Again, however, this argument fails when applied to the financing
area. The pro-reorganization argument is invoked by lenders trying to protect their preferences, see supra notes 65-66
and accompanying text, not by objecting unsecured creditors. Indeed, the attack often comes after the reorganization case
has converted to Chapter 7. See, e.g., Texlon, 596 F.2d at 1095; In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 860 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1984).
243. See supra note 176 for the complete text of rule 60(b)(6). The subsection is a residual ground for granting relief,
see 7 MooRE, supra note 204, 9 60.18[8], at 60-145, T 60.27[l], at 60-264, and is mutually exclusive of the first five
grounds. See In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 48
Bankr. 356, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Asusa, 47 Bankr. 928, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Shaffer, 8 Bankr. 497, 500
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Ireco, 2 Bankr. at 84; 7 MooRE, supra note 204, V 60.27[l], at 60-266; 11 C. NViGr & A.
MuaI.EIR, supra note 215, § 2864, at 217.
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cases as to the appropriate standard for applying rule 60(b)(6). Several cases state that
a liberal application is warranted because of the peculiar procedural nature of
bankruptcy cases and because of the importance of achieving a successful
reorganization. 244 These statements come dangerously close to resurrecting the
administrative order doctrine under the guise of a rule 60(b)(6) motion245 and as
such, should not be followed.
Instead, relief under rule 60(b)(6) should be granted only in extraordinary
circumstances, or in cases of extreme or undue hardship. 246 The Second Circuit took
this approach in a leading bankruptcy case considering the propriety of granting rule
60(b) relief from an order granting a certificate of indebtedness.2 47 Rather than stating
a more liberal basis for obtaining relief than those found in subsections (1) through
(5), subsection (6) presents a more demanding standard. 248
No matter what the standard is under rule 60(b)(6), proof of more than just
judicial error should be required to obtain relief. 249 More than under any other
provision of rule 60(b), courts applying rule 60(b)(6) must be careful not to let it
become a substitute for appeal, because of its generality and because it does not
contain any set outside time limit. The danger of rule 60(b)(6) becoming a substitute
for appeal would be particularly acute if relief could be obtained under that subsection
for judicial error250
The argument that relief under rule 60(b) should not be available based solely on
244. See In re Durkalec, 21 Bankr. 618, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); see also C.I.T. Corp. v. Johnson & Morgan
Contractors (In re Johnson & Morgan Contractors), 29 Bankr. 372, 374 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983) (following Durkalec);
International Coins & Currency, Inc. v. Listronics, Inc., 26 Bankr. 254, 255 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); Ireco, 2 Bankr. at
84.
245. For example, the FCX court cited Wayne and Pfister, the foundation cases for the administrative order doctrine,
as supporting the principle of rule 60(b)(6). In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833, 839 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
246. Emergency Beacon, 666 F.2d at 759; 7 MOORE, supra note 204, 60.27[1], at 60-269. As noted by one
commentator, "It is intended to be a means for accomplishing justice in exceptional situations; and, so confined, does not
violate the principle of finality of judgments." Id. 60.27[2], at 60-274. The court considering a rule 60(b)(6) motion
has only a narrow range of discretion, see In re Chung King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 550 (7th Cir. 1985), and in exercising
that discretion must consider the impact a modification of the order would have on the substantive rights of the parties
involved. 11 C. \Vtuo'rr & A. MujxR, supra note 215, § 2864, at 213.
247. Emergency Beacon, 666 F.2d at 755-61. In that case, the Second Circuit affirmed a 1978 order vacating a
1976 order to the extent that it had authorized the debtor in possession to issue a certificate of indebtedness to a lender
with accompanying priority and lien status. Id. at 755. The bases for modifying the 1976 order were (1) that the
bankruptcy court never intended to approve the certificate and never conducted a hearing on that issue directly, but instead
the debtor's counsel, who prepared the 1976 order which the court signed, unilaterally slipped in the provision authorizing
the certificate, id. at 755-57; and (2) even if the court had considered the request for a certificate initially, it probably
would have declined to grant approval, id. at 760-61. The Second Circuit determined that rule 60(b)(l) did not apply,
because the court never even intended to authorize the certificate, and that rule 60(b)(3) did not apply, because the
bankruptcy court had not found that a fraud had been proven, id. at 759, although the main reason for this finding seems
to be that the trustee who sought the modification did not really argue the fraud ground. Instead, the court gave relief under
rule 60(b)(6), finding that "the circumstances in the present case were extraordinary." Id.
248. See 11 C. WVRtorr & A. MinLtn, supra note 215, § 2857, at 160.
249. Seeln re Shaffer, 8 Bankr. 497,500 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); 7 MooRE, supra note 204, T 60.27[2], at 60-276
to -277. The Texlon court similarly declined to find that relief was merited for legal error under rule 60(b), although that
court did not mention the possibility of relief under 60(b)(6) expressly, but confined its discussion to 60(b)(1) and
60(b)(4). In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1979).
250. A party who chooses to seek relief for a legal error only through a rule 60(b) motion does so at the peril of
losing his or her right to appeal, however, since the filing of a 60(b) motion does not affect the finality of a judgment,
and the time for filing an appeal continues to run. 7 MOORE, supra note 204, T 60.29, at 60-327. Conversely, a timely
motion under rule 59(b) or 59(e) tolls the time for filing an appeal until that motion is exhausted. Id.
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a claim that the bankruptcy court committed judicial error in approving the lender
preference clauses presupposes that the court's decision was based on truthful, fairly
presented evidence. If the debtor or the lender intentionally misrepresented or
withheld evidence, then relief should be available under rule 60(b)(3).25 1
A leading Second Circuit case dealing with the application of rule 60(b) to
bankruptcy financing orders stated that "[o]rdinarily clause (3) is invoked where
material information has been withheld or incorrect or perjured evidence has been
intentionally supplied.' '252 Clause (3) focuses on the fraud of the party adverse to the
movant, here the lender, and asks whether it would be inequitable for that party to
retain the benefit obtained initially by its misconduct.25 3 Because of the general
policy favoring finality, the movant has the burden of proving such misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence.25 4
In a proper case, however, relief should be granted3 5 5 As mentioned earlier, no
court will grant lender preference clauses except on the proof of certain elements
establishing the urgent need for financing and the unavailability of such financing
except on the preferential terms sought.2 56 If the objecting unsecured creditors can
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the lender obtained a lender preference
clause by intentionally misrepresenting the existence of one of the substantive
prerequisites for that clause, relief under rule 60(b)(3) should be granted.257
251. See Bohm, supra note 20, at 311-12 n.76. Earlier I argued that such activity also should support a finding that
the lender was not in good faith and thus should not be entitled to the safe harbor of § 364(e). See supra notes 162-71
and accompanying text. Rule 60(b)(3) provides that relief may be granted for "fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party."
252. In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir. 1981). See also In re Georgia Steel, Inc., 25
Bankr. 790, 795 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); In -re- Futuronics Corp., 5 Bankr. 489, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying
attorneys' fees because of misrepresentations and improper conduct). In Ellingsen, the district court stated that the proper
recourse for the objecting creditors based on their allegation that the debtor and lender contrived an emergency and
"duped" the bankruptcy court into signing the order would have been to bring a rule 60(b) motion. In re Ellingsen
MacLean Oil Co., 65 Bankr. 358, 363 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
253. 7 MooRE, supra note 204, 60.2415], at 60-211. If the fraud is not by an adverse party, the proper basis and
procedure for relief is a motion under 60(b)(6) or on a "fraud on the court" theory, or by independent action, but not
under 60(b)(3). Id. at 60-216 to -217.
254. See 7 MOORE, supra note 204, 60.24[5], at 60-217 (burden and standard of proof); id. 60.37[1, at 60-379
(standard of proof); I1 C. WRIor & A. MTI.nR, supra note 215, § 2860, at 189 (burden of proof); id. § 2861, at 195
(standard of proof).
255. For example, relief was granted under rule 60(b)(3) with regard to a cash collateral order in Georgia Steel, 25
Bankr. at 795. In that case the lender knowingly withheld information from the debtor and the bankruptcy court about the
extent of its security interests in certain vehicles of the debtor. The court thus was misled into entering an order which
conferred substantially greater benefits on the lender than the court expected or intended.
256. See supra note 79.
257. For example, a cross-collateralization clause should be granted only if, among other things, the debtor proves
that no alternative financing can be obtained on acceptable terms and that the lender will not lend without the clause. In
re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). If the lender would have lent even without
the clause, or if the lender or debtor knew that alternative financing on acceptable terms was available, but misrepresented
those facts to the court, then the bankruptcy court should not hesitate to strike the clause pursuant to rule 60(b)(3). Such
a scenario also would undermine the lender's good faith under § 364(e). See supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
The motion in such a case probably would have to be entered within one year after the order was entered, since rule
60(b) provides an outside time limit of one year for actions under 60(b)(3). Although fraud may be attacked in three ways:
by a 60(b)(3) motion, by a motion alleging "fraud upon the court," or by an independent action in equity, see 7 MOORE,
supra note 204, 60.33, at 60-350 to -351, the type of fraud discussed in this Article would be characterized as "intrinsic
fraud," see id. 60.24[5], at 60-211, which may be raised only under 60(b)(3). See 11 C. WRIGTrr & A. Ml.LnE, supra
note 215, § 2861, at 195-96. Even though the one-year time limit does not apply to actions for fraud upon the court, see
7 MOORE, supra note 204, 60.2414], at 60-210, or to independent actions, nondisclosure or misrepresentation by a party
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The final fact situation raising a possibility of relief under rule 60(b) is where the
financing order was entered after little or no notice to the affected creditors, a
pervasive occurrence in the bankruptcy financing context. 25s As will be explored in
detail in the following Part, rules 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6) might apply in such a case.259
Relief under rule 60(b)(4) will be given only if the financing order is void, which will
occur only in the rare case in which the order was entered in violation of procedural
due process. 26° Even if the notice inadequacies are not severe enough to rise to the
level of a due process violation, relief still may be obtained under rule 60(b)(6).261
Courts are more inclined to grant relief under rule 60(b) when the aggrieved party has
not yet had a meaningful chance to be heard on the merits, the desire for finality in
such a case giving way to the desire for justice. 262
V. THE NOTICE PROBLEM: LARGE CASES AND LrrrLE TIME
A. Overview of the Problem
Given the emergency circumstances under which financing orders are often
entered, 263 inadequacy of the notice of and opportunity for a hearing on a requested
order often is raised as a basis for seeking to overturn that order, both in appeals 264
and in motions for reconsideration. Given the commonality of the notice issues dealt
with in both of those contexts, this Part separately explores the notice problem,
suggesting a framework for resolving notice questions in bankruptcy generally, and
then applying that framework to the two types of attacks on financing orders
considered in this Article.
The notice issue has proved troublesome in bankruptcy cases. 265 Much confu-
or their attorney does not constitute "fraud upon the court," see id. 60.33, at 60-360 to -362; 11 C. WRIor & A.
MituR, supra note 215, § 2870, at 253-54, 256, and may not form the basis for an independent action. See 7 MooRE,
supra note 204, 60.33, at 60-350, 60.37[1], at 60-376. Judge Ordin's suggestion that Texlon could have been handled
on a "fraud upon the court" theory, see Ordin, supra note 20, at 176, thus is close to the mark; the proper characterization
instead is a rule 60(b)(3) motion for fraud or misrepresentation. Fraud upon the court contemplates instead an actual
interference with the impartial functions of the court, such as bribery. In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 693, 698 (7th
Cir. 1985).
258. See supra notes 33 and 40 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 241 and infra notes 311-12 and 328 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., In re Columbia Motor Express, 49 Bankr. 216, 220 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (relief granted under
rule 60(b)(6) when no notice given of an application for a § 364(c) financing order). See also Amick v. Hotz (In re
Atlantic, Pac. & Gulf Oil Co.), 101 F.2d 311,313 (8th Cir. 1939).
262. See Columbia Motor, 49 Bankr. at 220; In re Ireco Indus., 2 Bankr. 76, 83-84 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1979); 7
MooRE, supra note 204, T 60.27[2], at 60-276; 11 C. WRIorr & A. Muins, supra note 215, § 2857, at 160.
263. See supra notes 33 and 40 and accompanying text.
264. The notice deficiency argument is used in two different ways in the context of an appellate attack on a financing
order. The first is to establish the bad faith of the lender so as to avoid mootness under § 364(e). See supra note 172 and
infra notes 321 and 323 and accompanying text. Once mooness has been avoided, then inadequate notice can be used
to show that the prerequisite of "after notice and a hearing" imposed by the substantive sections of § 364 was not
satisfied. See, e.g., In re American Resources Mgmt. Corp., 51 Bankr. 713, 721 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
265. For example, the court in In re Graphic Arts Lithographers, 71 Bankr. 774, 777 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987), held
that it did not even have to reach the issue of the adequacy of the notice given, since it held the appeal was moot under
§ 364(e). The court thus failed to recognize that inadequate notice itself can be a basis for establishing bad faith by the
lender, or even that the order could be void as a violation of procedural due process. Interestingly, and inexplicably, the
court cited with approval the decision of Credit Alliance Corp. v. Dunning-Ray Ins. Agency (In re Blumer), 66 Bankr.
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sion has resulted from a failure to distinguish the different situations in which notice
may be required, and the different notice issues that may arise. Those issues include:
who is entitled to notice, discussed in subpart V.B.; the adequacy of the notice and
opportunity for a hearing given, examined in subpart V.C.; and, finally, the legal
effect when the notice given is found to be inadequate, applied in subpart V.D. to
appeals of financing orders under section 364(e) and to motions for relief from a
judgment under rule 60(b). 2 66
B. Who is Entitled to Notice?
The answer to this question defines who has standing to attack final bankruptcy
orders on the ground that they failed to receive adequate notice.2 67 In a large
reorganization case involving thousands of creditors and shareholders, the expendi-
tures of time and money resulting from requiring notice to all of those persons of all
proposed orders in the case would be prohibitive. Furthermore, as illustrated by the
financing situation, actions sometimes must be taken on an emergency basis in a
reorganization case in order to save the possibility of reorganizing at all.268 Requiring
prior notice to be given to the thousands of creditors and shareholders might defeat
the efficacy of that urgent action. Yet, our system of justice has long adhered to the
concept that persons must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before they
may be deprived of "property.' 269 The dilemma in reorganization cases is recon-
109, 113-14 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986), which held that the financing order was void because due process had not been
satisfied.
In Texlon, the Second Circuit did not even address the possibility that due process might apply, even though the order
had been entered ex parte. The court said only that the Act did not require notice, and thus the financing order was not
void. In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099 (2d Cir. 1979). Despite that conclusion, the court went on to avoid the
order in part because of its exparte nature, but pursuant to the discarded administrative order doctrine. See supra subpart
IV.A. Those courts that have recognized the problems inherent in trying to reconcile the creditors' right to notice with the
need to keep reorganizations alive, such as In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350, 355 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980), have
struggled with the difficulty of the problem.
266. In addressing these questions, the distinction between statutory (or rule) and constitutional notice requirements
must be borne in mind. Those requirements are not necessarily coextensive in all cases. Obviously, a statute or rule
purporting to authorize notice below the constitutional procedural due process minimum is ineffective. For example, in
In re Garland Corp., 6 Bankr. 456, 461 n. 12 (Bankr. App. D. Mass. 1980), the court noted that § 364(e) could not bar
a constitutional challenge. Accord, Blumer, 66 Bankr. at 113. But see Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Center
wholesale, Inc. (In re Center wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440, 1451 (9th Cir. 1985). However, a statute or rule may well
impose notice requirements more demanding than the Constitution. See infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
Ascertaining which is violated may be critical for determining the appropriate remedy. A constitutionally deficient order
is void, see infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text, while orders entered after insufficient notice only under a statute
or rule will be more difficult to overturn. See Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d at 1448.
267. Thus, in In re Photo Promotion Assoc., 53 Bankr. 759, 762-63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), an unsecured
creditor who personally did not receive any notice of a financing order was held not to have been deprived of due process
when the unsecured creditors' committee received notice of and consented to the order. But see In re Nordyke, 43 Bankr.
856, 861 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1984), in which the court stated that any creditor who does not receive notice has standing to
raise the notice deficiency. This conclusion assumes, however, that all creditors are entitled to notice of all matters in a
Chapter 11 case, a conclusion disputed below. See infra notes 277-91 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit in Center
Wholesale stated that a creditor must have a property right affected by a financing order to have standing to attack that
order by a rule 60(b) motion. Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d at 1445-46. But see Blrmer, 66 Bankr. at 112. Unsecured
creditors do not have such a property right. See Garland, 6 Bankr. at 462.
268. See Sullivan Ford, 2 Bankr. at 355.
269. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313, 318 (1950)
("exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability notice must be
such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties"); In re Delafield Dev., 54 Bankr. 442, 444 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
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ciling these sometimes competing policies. If notice may be given to representatives
of affected creditor and shareholder groups, the reconciliation is much easier to
effect.
The Bankruptcy Code gives a minimal amount of general guidance as to the
requirements for notice and the opportunity for a hearing. Notice of the commence-
ment of the case must be given.270 After commencement, a number of orders,
including financing orders, may be entered only "after notice and a hearing," a
defined term of art.2 71 Under this standard notice generally must be given.272 The
Code does not address the issue of who is entitled to notice when the term "after
notice and a hearing" is used.
The Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure partially fill in this statutory gap and state
who is entitled to notice. While rule 2002 requires all creditors and shareholders to
receive notice of certain critical matters, 273 rule 4001(c), which covers financing
orders, does not require notice to be given to all creditors, but instead permits notice
to representatives of creditors. 274
The distinctions drawn in the Rules as to which matters must be noticed to all
creditors and which only to a representative group are, for the most part, right on
target. Whether individual notice should be required, or whether notice to a
1985). The Tenth Circuit in Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 623 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1984), stated
that the right to be heard is not any the less even though the ultimate result almost certainly would not have been changed
had the party been allowed to state its views. See also Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Congress believed that due process required this notice to be
given to all creditors and shareholders. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 331 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AnsuN. NEws 5963, 6288; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo.
& Anomi. News 5787, 5828.
271. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (1982) provides:
(I) "after notice and a hearing", or a similar phrase-
(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a
hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances; but
(B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if such notice is given properly and if-
(i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a party in interest; or
(ii) there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such act must be done, and the court
authorizes such act ....
272. See infra note 309 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether prior notice may be dispensed with under
Code § 102(1) even in an emergency situation. Even those cases recognizing such a possibility state that the circumstances
permitting dispensing with notice are extremely rare and that a full noticed hearing after the fact must be held as soon as
is feasible. See, e.g., In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350, 356-57 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) ("exceptional scrutiny"
required).
273. FED. R. BaKRu. P. 2002. For example, all creditors must receive 20 days notice by mail of the time to vote on
a plan, id. R. 2002(a)(6), and 25 days notice of the plan confirmation hearing, id. R. 2002(b)(2).
274. FEn. R. BANRs. P. 4001(c) provides:
(c) Obtaining Credit. (1) Motion; Service. A motion for authority to obtain credit shall be made in
accordance with Rule 9014 and shall be served on any committee appointed under the Code or its
authorized agent, or, if no committee has been appointed, on the creditors listed on the list filed pursuant
to Rule 1007(d), and on such other entities as the court may direct. The motion shall be accompanied by
a copy of the agreement. (2) Hearing. The court may commence a final hearing on a motion for authority
to obtain credit no earlier than 15 days after service of the motion. If the motion so requests, the court may
conduct a hearing before such 15 day period expires, but the court may authorize the obtaining of credit
only to the extent necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a final hearing.
(3) Notice. Notice of hearing pursuant to this subdivision shall be given to the parties on whom service of
the motion is required by paragraph (1) of this subdivision and to such other entities as the court may direct.
The rule 1007(d) list referred to in rule 4001(c)(1) must contain the 20 largest unsecured creditors. FED. R.
BAnKR. P. 1007(d) (1987).
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representative instead should suffice, should depend on what is being noticed. If the
notice is of a matter that specifically affects the particular creditor in an individualized
way, such as something affecting the creditor's own claim, then that creditor should
receive individual notice.27 5 No representative would have sufficient identity of
interest to protect adequately the creditor's interest.
If, however, the matter being noticed affects a class of creditors in an identical
way, then notice to a group adequately representing that class should suffice.
Financing orders containing lender preference clauses fall within this latter category,
since the effect of those clauses is to prefer the lender's prepetition unsecured or
secured claim over the claims of the entire class of unsecured creditors. 276 The
tradeoff supporting the granting of such clauses, the supposed enhancing of the
possibility of a successful reorganization, would benefit each member of the
unsecured creditor class in an identical way. In this type of case, adequate
representation, contemplated by rule 4001(c), should be enough to protect the rights
of the class.
Does the representative notice provided for by rule 4001(c) comport with due
process, however? In the specific bankruptcy context there is little law on this precise
question, with differing general views expressed by the courts. 277 The only direct
holding upheld notice to only the official creditors' committee. 278 Most of the
constitutional bankruptcy notice cases have dealt with an individual creditor's claim
or lien being affected, with individual notice then required.2 79
The better view is that due process does not require all unsecured creditors to
receive individual notice of all matters taking place in a Chapter 11 reorganization
case. Such an inflexible view of due process, which might by endangering the
275. One example is notice of a bar date for filing claims. See, e.g., New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344
U.S. 293, 296 (1953); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1984); In re Intaco P.R.,
Inc., 494 F.2d 94, 98 n.8, 99 (1st Cir. 1974); In re Harbor Tank Storage Co., 385 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1967); Randbre
Corp. v. Ladney (In re Randbre Corp.), 66 Bankr. 482, 485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (claim expungement). Another
example is notice of a proceeding affecting a lien of the creditor, such as a request for a priming lien under § 364(d). See,
e.g., New York, 344 U.S. at 296; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434, 460 (1886); Ray v.
Norseworthy, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 128, 136 (1875); In re Center wholesale, 759 F.2d 1440, 1448-50 (9th Cir. 1985);
Coursey v. International Harvester Co., 109 F.2d 774, 777-78 (10th Cir. 1940); In re Mannington Pottery Co., 104 F.
Supp. 506, 514-17 (N.D. W. Va. 1952); Tabb, supra note 5, at 130 n. 110; Tondel & Scott, supra note 49, at 45. Indeed,
in such instances due process requires individual notice. See, e.g., New York, 344 U.S. at 296; Center Wholesale, 759
F.2d at 1448-50.
276. See supra note 6.
277. Representative notice was upheld in In re Photo Promotion Assoc., 53 Bankr. 759, 762-63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985). A number of courts have implicitly upheld notice to a representative group. See, e.g., In re Garland, 6 Bankr. 456,
461, 463 (Bankr. App. D. Mass. 1980); In re Adamson Co., 29 Bankr. 937, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983);
Anderson-Walker Indus. v. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Anderson-Walker Indus.), 3 Bankr. 551, 552 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1980); In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350,354 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980). See infra note 299. Other courts in dictum have
suggested that due process requires individualized notice to all unsecured creditors of all reorganization matters. See, e.g.,
A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1015 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986); Reliable Elec. Co. v.
Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1984); In re Blumer, 66 Bankr. 109, 114 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); Sapir
v. Coppinger Color Lab (In re Photo Promotion Assoc.), 72 Bankr. 606, 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Blumer).
In none of those cases was the possibility of representative notice considered. Each involved either a total absence of
notice to anyone, or a lack of notice of an individual matter to the particular creditor.
278. Photo Promotion, 53 Bankr. at 762-63. In that case an unsecured creditor that had not received notice of an
application for a financing order challenged the order on due process grounds. The court rejected the challenge on the
ground that the unsecured creditors' committee had notice of and consented to the financing order.
279. See cases cited supra note 275.
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reorganization as a whole effectively defeat the interests of the very unsecured
creditors supposedly to be protected, is not required by the cases280 or by the logic of
the fifth amendment. Instead, the flexible command of due process 281 is satisfied by
the initial notice of the pendency of the case to all creditors, and by notice of the
particular action to an adequate representative group.
The class action cases, which present the closest analogy to bankruptcy
reorganization cases, 282 support this interpretation of due process. In mandatory class
actions,283 although all class members will be bound by a judgment, 284 a majority of
courts have held that due process does not require notice to all class members even
of the institution of the action and of the class certification proceeding. Those
holdings are based on the idea that adequate representation sufficiently protects the
due process rights of absent class members.285
Even in those mandatory class action cases requiring initial notice, 286 and in rule
280. See, e.g., Photo Promotion, 53 Bankr. at 762-63.
281. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 15 n.15 (1978); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1014; In re Stanley Hotel, 15 Bankr. 660, 665 (D.
Colo. 1981).
282. A bankruptcy reorganization case is most analogous to the limited fund cases under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(l)(B), which provides for the prosecution of a class action if:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of...
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests ....
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendment to rule 23 states:
In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class will necessarily or probably have
an adverse practical effect on the interests of other members who should therefore be represented in the lawsuit.
This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all
claims.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (Adv. Comm. Note 1966).
The analogy to bankruptcy reorganization eases is evident.
283. By "mandatory" is meant the application of the judgment in the class action to all members of the class, who
have no right to be excluded from the operation of the judgment. This mandatory feature applies to actions under Federal
Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), but not to those under 23(b)(3). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
284. See, e.g., Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 508 F.2d 239, 254-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); 7B C. Wiuorrr, A.
Mit E & M. KANE, Fa .ri PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at 191-94 (2d ed. 1986).
285. See Citizens Envtl. Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D. Kan.), aff'don other grounds, 484 F.2d 870
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); C. WRtGor, A. MillER & M. KANE, supra note 284, § 1786, at
194-97; Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. Rav. 629, 654 (1965).
Support for the representative view can be found even in the seminal Mullane case, which involved the question of
what notice to trust beneficiaries was required of a judicial proceeding to settle finally the accounts of the trustee of a
common trust fund. In that case, as in a bankruptcy reorganization affecting the rights of unsecured creditors, "[t]he
individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319. While the Court
did hold that notice by publication was insufficient as to known present beneficiaries, id. at 318, the Court went on to note
that notice to most of the class would "safeguard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the
benefit of all," id. at 319. Certainly the class action cases have interpreted Mullane as allowing notice to representatives
of specific matters within a case to suffice to protect the procedural rights of the whole class. See supra note 284 and infra
notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Hoston v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650, 658 (E.D. La. 1975); Richmond Black Police
Officers' Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151, 158 (E.D. Va. 1974); Brandt v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 62 F.R.D.
160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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23(b)(3)287 cases in which initial notice is required, 288 due process usually has not
been held to require absent class members to receive notice of all subsequent
proceedings within the case that might affect the interests of the class. 289 Instead, the
initial notice of the proceeding is considered sufficient to allow the individual class
member to appear in the case and to monitor subsequent activities. 290
The argument that due process is satisfied by initial notice of the case to all
interested parties and by subsequent notice to representatives only does not run afoul
of cases holding that general notice of the pendency of a reorganization case is not
sufficient notice of an order barring individual claims unless filed by a particular
date. 291 Those cases have required individual notice of the bar order. They are
287. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides in part that a class action may be maintained if the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The rule goes on to state some factors relevant to the court's determination. The Advisory Committee Note
to the 1966 amendments to rule 23(b)(3) states:
In the situations to which this subdivision relates, class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as in those
described above, but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending upon the particular facts.
Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) (Adv. Comm. Note 1966).
288. See, e.g., Gert v. Elgin Nat'l Indus., 773 F.2d 154, 159 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Warner Communications Sec.
Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 746 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); 7B C. VIotrr, A. MuiER &
M. KANE, supra note 284, § 1786, at 188.
289. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972);
Harris v. Graddick, 615 F. Supp. 239, 244 (M.D. Ala. 1985); 7B C. WIoTrr, A. MiER & M. KANE, supra note 284,
§ 1793, at 298. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) provides for permissive notice of such matters:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders:... (2) requiring,
for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given
in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action .... (emphasis
added).
The pernissive nature of the rule is confirmed by the Advisory Committee Note, which states that "Subdivision
(d)(2) does not require notice at any stage, but rather calls attention to its availability and invokes the court's discretion."
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) (Adv. Comm. Note 1966).
The only exception to this principle is contained in FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), which requires the giving of notice of a
proposed dismissal or compromise of the action. 7B C. Wiorrr, A. MITIFR & M. KANE, supra note 284, § 1797, at 340,
359-60.
290. See 7B C Wiuoirr, A. MiuxR & M. KANE, supra note 284, § 1786, at 189-90.
Any consideration of the class action cases must take into account the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), in which the Court held that the notice requirement of rule 23(c)(2) mandated giving
individual notice and not publication notice to each of the 2,250,000 easily identifiable class members, id. at 175-77. The
Court based its decision directly on the language of the rule, and not on due process, although it certainly intimated that
the rule was derived from the dictates of due process. Id. at 174-75. The Court expressly rejected arguments that notice
to only part of the class could be justified either because of the tremendous cost of individual notice to all identifiable class
members or on a theory that adequate representation would exist. Id. at 175-77.
Eisen is distinguishable from an application for a bankruptcy financing order. First, of course, any bankruptcy
proceeding has the overriding consideration of minimizing expense in order to facilitate the possible financial
reorganization of the troubled debtor. Second, the matter being noticed in Eisen affected each class member in an
individual way, since a rule 23(b)(3) class action by its very nature requires notice of institution of the action so that
potential class members may decide whether or not to participate in the class. Financing orders, however, do affect
creditors identically, and thus representative notice should suffice. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text. The
better analogy in the class action context is to notice of matters after the institution of the action, which need not be
individually noticed, see supra note 289 and accompanying text, because those matters impact on the now-determined
class identically.
291. See, e.g., New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson
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distinguishable from financing order cases, however, because the action being
noticed affected the specific creditor in an individual way by the direct deprivation of
a property right. In the financing order context, as noted above, the class interest is
identical, and thus notice to a representative should suffice.
If representative notice in general does satisfy due process, the only question is
whether the representative group being noticed fulfills the requirements of adequacy
of representation 92 and, related thereto, of typicality.2 93 In a class action case those
questions must be decided specifically by the court in certifying the class and
approving the class representative. 294 Although such rigid controls to ensure
adequacy and typicality do not exist in bankruptcy cases, the representative group
required by rule 4001(c) to be noticed should be adequate.
The preferred group designated by rule 4001(c) is the official committee of
unsecured creditors, if one has been formed.2 95 That committee is an adequate
representative; the Bankruptcy Code itself mandates that the committee be
representative. 296 If no committee has been formed, as may often be true if the
financing order is presented in the first days of the case, 297 the rule instead allows for
notice to the twenty largest unsecured creditors.2 98 The statutory mandate of
representativeness then does not exist.2 99
Despite this concern, notice to the twenty largest unsecured creditors still should
Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620, 622 (10th Cir. 1984); In re Intaco P.R., Inc., 494 F.2d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1974); In re Harbor
Tank Storage Co., 385 F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir. 1967); In re Randbre Corp., 66 Bankr. 482,485 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
292. In the class action context adequacy of representation is indispensable to maintaining the action. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(a)(4); 7B C. vRitGTr, A. Muj.ER & M. KANE, supra note 284, § 1765, at 262-63, 266-68. See also Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
293. Typicality also is a prerequisite to maintaining a class action. See Fertig v. Blue Cross, 68 F.R.D. 53, 57 (N.D.
Iowa 1974); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); 7B C. WRIor, A. Milt.F & M. KANE, supra note 284, § 1764, at 228.
294. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1); 7B C. VWiGTrr, A. Mnr .E & M. KANE, supra note 284, § 1785, at 89-90.
295. Fa. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1). 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) requires the United States
Trustee to appoint a committee of unsecured creditors in every Chapter 11 case. Id. Section 1103 specifies the powers and
duties of such a committee. For a discussion of creditors' committees under the Code, see Andrews, The Chapter 11
Creditors' Committee: Statutory Watchdog?, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 247 (1985); DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under
the Bankruptcy Court- A Primer, 55 Am,. BANKR. L.J. 43 (1981).
296. 1I U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2), (b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Former 11 U.S.C. § 1102(c) (Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, § 1102(c), 92 Star. 2549, 2626 (1978)) provided further that the court could change
the membership of an existing committee to ensure adequate representation of the claims in that class. This section was
repealed as part of the 1986 legislation instituting the United States Trustee system nationwide, which gave a larger
administrative role to the United States Trustee, but it is unlikely that the repeal of that subsection was intended to change
in any way the requirement that the committee of unsecured creditors be representative. Furthermore, the committee
members are fiduciaries of the entire class. See DeNatale, supra note 295, at 56-58.
297. See, e.g., In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350, 352 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980). The formation of the creditors'
committee usually takes a number of weeks, varying in detail according to local practice and the nature of the case. The
normal procedure is for the United States Trustee to send notice of the formation meeting to the largest creditors, taken
from the rule 1007(d) list. See supra note 274. The Code states that the committee "shall ordinarily" consist of the seven
largest claim holders. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
298. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1).
299. Those 20 creditors do not clearly have a fiduciary duty to the unsecured creditor body as a whole. Two leading
financing order notice cases under the Code assumed that all creditors had to be noticed when no committee had been
formed. See Sullivan Ford, 2 Bankr. at 354; In re Adamson Co., 29 Bankr. 937, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984). They did
not consider the possibility, however, of notice to the 20 largest creditors. Other cases have stated that such notice is
enough, see, e.g., In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 365 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (20 largest); In re Borne
Chem, Co., 9 Bankr. 263, 265 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (10 largest), and indeed in the absence of an official committee is
required. See In re Garland Corp., 6 Bankr. 456,458 n.2 (Bankr. App. D. Mass. 1980) ("The nonexistence of an official
Creditors' Committee does not excuse the failure to attempt notification of the twenty largest unsecured creditors.").
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be sufficient. First, those twenty creditors have claims of the same class or rank as
the entire body of unsecured creditors, and accordingly will be affected by the entry
of the financing order in a way identical to the whole class. Thus, their arguments
made even in their pure self interest would, to the extent successful, "inure to the
benefit of all." 300 Second, the unsecured creditors' committee almost always will be
formed from that very group of the twenty largest unsecured creditors, 30' and the
same entities thus are likely to receive the notice in either case.
C. What Constitutes Adequate Notice?
Deciding that a party is entitled to notice still leaves the question of what length
and form of notice is required to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution,
Bankruptcy Code, and Bankruptcy Rules. The Bankruptcy Code provides only that
the notice must be "appropriate in the particular circumstances.' '302 Less notice is
required in an emergency situation than in a nonemergency case.303 The important
question is how much less, since applications for financing orders routinely are
presented on an emergency basis. 3° 4
The Bankruptcy Rules are more explicit than the Code as to the notice
requirements for financing orders. Rule 4001(c) states that "[tihe court may
commence a final hearing on a motion for authority to obtain credit no earlier than
fifteen days after service of the motion.' '305 Since an absolute fifteen day rule would
cause hardships in emergency financing cases, rule 4001(c) allows the court to
conduct a hearing before the fifteen day period expires, but provides that at that
hearing "the court may authorize the obtaining of credit only to the extent necessary
to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a final hearing.'"306
After this emergency hearing, the court then is to hold a final hearing on full
notice. 30 7
300. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950).
301. See supra note 297.
302. 11 U.S.C. § 102(l)(a) (1982). See supra note 271 for the complete text of § 102(1).
303. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust (In re EUingsen MacLean Oil Co.), 834
F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Public Leasing Corp., 344 F. Supp. 754, 756, 758 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Garland,
6 Bankr. at 458 n.2; In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Stanley Hotel, 15
Bankr. 660, 665 (D. Colo. 1981); In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350, 355 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980).
304. See Initial Financing Restrictions, supra note 19, at 1691-92, 1699. See also Montco, Inc. v. Barr (In re
Emergency Beacon Corp.), 666 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating in dictum that exparte financing orders are the norm
and thus are permissible).
305. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(e)(2). See supra note 274 for the complete text of rule 4001(c).
306. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(2). This standard, obviously analogous to the standard for a temporary restraining
order, see FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), is derived from an important early Code financing order ease. See Sullivan Ford, 2
Bankr. at 355-57.
307. Even before rule 4001(c) was promulgated, a number of bankruptcy courts had followed the suggestion of
Sullivan Ford and had structured two-step hearing procedures to accommodate the debtor's emergency needs and the
procedural rights of creditors. See, e.g., In re Center wholesale, 759 F.2d 1440, 1449 n.21 (9th Cir. 1985) (approving
such a practice in dictum); In re Garland, 6 Bankr. 456, 458 (Bankr. App. D. Mass. 1980); In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr.
833, 837-39 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Roblin Indus., 52 Bankr. 241,244 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Sheehan,
38 Bankr. 859, 863 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984); In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 365, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983); In re Antico Mfg., 31 Bankr. 103,104 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). The Roblin case is illustrative. The initial hearing
was held on one day telephonic notice to the 20 largest creditors, and the final hearing five weeks later on notice to all
creditors. Roblin, 52 Bankr. at 242. Even in the leading case upholding an initial ex parte financing hearing, Public
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The rule apparently does not permit dispensing with prior notice even in the
emergency case, since it uses the mandatory wording "shall." ' 30 8 Whether the Code
allows for an emergency exception to the prior notice requirement is a debated
point.309 The due process cases do not require prior notice, as long as a noticed
hearing is held before rights are finally fixed. 310 Thus, if a lender preference clause
is only tentatively approved at an ex parte hearing without notice, subject to final
approval at a properly noticed hearing, no constitutional problems should exist. If,
however, the lender preference clause is entered as part of afinal order ex parte and
without notice, that order is probably unconstitutional as a violation of due
process. 311 The order then would be void and not protectable under section 364(e) or
rule 60(b).312
Even if the initial order were not final, thus removing the constitutional
Leasing, 344 F. Supp. at 755, a subsequent noticed hearing was held which ratified the actions taken at the earlier hearing.
Id. at 755-56.
308. FED. R. BANR. P. 4001(c)(3) provides that "[nlotice of hearing pursuant to this subdivision shall be given"
to the required parties (emphasis added).
309. The statute supports a construction that notice may never be dispensed with. The hearing requirement is
expressly stated to be subject to possible waiver in an emergency case. II U.S.C. § 102(1)(B)(ii) (1982). No similar
exception is stated for the notice requirement, and indeed a statutory precondition to the no-hearing exception is that notice
be given. A permissible inference is that prior notice is always required. See In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099
(2d Cir. 1979) (dictum); In re Blumer, 66 Bankr. 109, 113 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); P. MUtRPY, CRErroRs' RiGTrs iN
BANKRUPTCY § 8.05, at 8-8 n.3 (1980); Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 20, at 90; see also Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Looney
(In re Looney), 823 F.2d 788, 791 (4th Cir. 1987) (§ 362 context). Sullivan Ford, on the other hand, suggested that in
an extreme emergency prior notice might be foregone, and in such a case proposed adoption of an ex parte procedure
similar to that for obtaining a temporary restraining order without notice pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). In re Sullivan
Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350, 355-57 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980). This suggestion has been echoed by a number of courts. See,
e.g., In re Columbia Motor Express, 49 Bankr. 216, 218 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41
Bankr. 859, 861. Perhaps the point is largely academic if, as is suggested in the text accompanying note 314 infra, it is
very unlikely that there could be a financing emergency so dire that no prior notice whatsoever could be given. This is
true only if courts follow the lead of Sullivan and refuse relief on an "emergency" basis when the facts do not indicate
that the reorganization will fail if a few hours or even days notice is given.
A hearing may not be required, however. In an emergency the court is empowered to authorize the act requested
without an actual hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(B)(ii) (1982). See Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d at 1449 n.21; TexIon, 596
F.2d 1092, 1099 (dictum); Bradshaw v. Waldschmidt (In re London, Inc.), 70 Bankr. 63, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987);
Columbia Motor, 49 Bankr. at 218; In re Adamson Co., 29 Bankr. 937, 939 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); Sullivan Ford, 2
Bankr. at 354. The statements by the legislative leaders accompanying the presentation of the final form of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 to Congress, which is in effect the equivalent of the conference report for that law, noted with regard
to § 102(1):
In very limited emergency circumstances, there will be insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before
an action must be taken. The action sought to be taken may be taken if authorized by the court at an ex pane
hearing of which a record is made in open court. A full hearing after the fact will be available in such an
instance.
124 CoNo. REc. H32,393 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124 CoNG. REc. S33,993 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
310. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434, 456 (1886); A.H. Robins v. Piccinin, 788
F.2d 994, 1014 (4th Cir. 1986); Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d at 1449 n.21; Smith v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 58
Bankr. 603, 605 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Sheehan, 38 Bankr. at 863; Tabb, supra note 5, at 130 n.110; Initial Financing
Restrictions, supra note 19, at 1691.
311. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 n.17 (1978); In re Center Wholesale,
759 F.2d 1440, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1985); Blumer, 66 Bankr. at 114; Garland, 6 Bankr. at 462 n. 17;Adamson, 29 Bankr.
at 939. Several cases have failed to note the due process problem inherent in a completely exparte financing order. See,
e.g., Texon, 596 F.2d at 1099; In re Public Leasing Corp., 344 F. Supp. 754, 755-56 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Columbia
Motor, 49 Bankr. at 218-20. Entry of an exparte final order also would constitute a violation of § 102(1), see supra notes
270 and 309 and accompanying text, and rule 4001(c). See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d at 1448-50 (rule 60(b)(4)); Blumer, 66 Bankr. at 113-14 (§ 364(e));
In re Randbre Corp., 66 Bankr. 482, 488 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rule 60(b)(5)); see also Asusa, 47 Bankr. at 931; In
re Photo Promotion Assoc., 53 Bankr. 759, 761-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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impediment, the stricter requirement of prior notice imposed by rule 4001(c) makes
sense. A court which already has made findings of fact and conclusions of law
sufficient to support the approval of lender preference clauses at an initial hearing
might be predisposed to hold the same way at a final hearing, tacitly reversing the
burden of proof at the final hearing. 31 3 The counter argument is that the pro-
reorganization goal must always be paramount, and that prior notice must be
dispensed with if necessary to save the reorganization in an extreme emergency. It is
difficult to conceive of a financing emergency so urgent that even overnight notice
cannot be given.314 Yet, once any exception to the prior notice rule is recognized, the
possibility of abusing that exception appears. The regular invocation of other
supposedly extreme measures in the financing context 315 suggests that this concern
might not be unduly speculative. In summary, rule 4001(c) properly provides that the
appropriate representative group must receive prior notice even of a temporary
emergency authorization.
Assuming then that some prior notice must be given, the question is what
amount and form of notice is required. The seminal case of Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Company dictates that the notice must be sent by a method
reasonably calculated to reach the party entitled to receive the notice and must give
that party sufficient time and information to exercise in a meaningful way its right to
be heard. 316
The first aspect, that the notice be sent in a way reasonably calculated to reach
the intended audience, has not been a problem in the financing order cases. 317 The
requirements of timeliness and specificity have caused more problems for the
313. In other words, the court would essentially demand that the unsecured creditors objecting to the clause show
why the initial order should not have been entered, instead of strictly requiring the debtor and lender to prove why the
lender preference clause should be granted.
314. As noted above, see supra note 309, even the Sullivan Ford court, which recognized the possibility of
dispensing with notice, refused to do so under the facts presented. In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350, 357 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1980).
31< Lender preference clauses are a current example. An example under the prior Act was the granting of
superpriority status to lenders. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 168 & n.334.
316. The constitutional minimum is stated by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950):
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as
reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance.
But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.
(citations omitted).
317. One potential tension between the cases and rule 4001(c) may develop over whether telephonic notice alone is
sufficient. The cases have approved such a form of notice. See, e.g., In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599,
605 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Blumer, 66 Bankr. 109, 113 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); In re Anderson-Walker Indus., 3 Bankr.
551, 552 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980); Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 20, at 90; contra, Sullivan Ford, 2 Bankr. at 354. The
Rules, however, require service of the motion requesting authority to obtain credit, FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1) (1987),
which must be done either by mail or in a way authorized by Federal Rule 4. Id. R. 9014, 7004. This would eliminate
any argument that service of the motion itself could be accomplished by telephone. The service requirement probably only
applies to the final hearing under rule 4001(c) and not to a temporary emergency authorization.
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courts. 31 8 The distinction between a temporary and a final authorization is relevant to
the outcome, with the courts more lenient if the order entered is subject to review at
a later hearing on full notice. 319 Rule 4001(c) does not address the amount of notice
required for the temporary hearing, 320 leaving the courts free to assess on a
case-by-case basis the adequacy of the time given, considering all of the circum-
stances. The next subpart suggests a framework for resolving the issue of the
adequacy of the notice given.
D. Application of a Notice Framework to Section 364(e) and Rule 60(b)
This subpart addresses the question of what remedy is available to objecting
creditors if a notice violation has occurred and proposes a framework for resolving
notice issues. The two possibilities for relief are those considered in this Article:
reversal of the financing order on appeal321 or vacation or modification of the order
by the bankruptcy court on a motion to reconsider. 322 An appellate attack must
overcome the mootness limitations of section 364(e), thus requiring the objecting
creditors to prove either that the lender acted in bad faith323 or that the order was void
as a violation of due process. A rule 60(b) motion will succeed if the order is void, 324
or, even if the order is not void, relief may be granted "for any other reason" under
rule 60(b)(6).32 5 While unavailable in normal circumstances, this latter provision
318. A rough pattern seems to be evolving. If one day notice or less is given, the courts are inclined to grant relief.
See, e.g., In re Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d 1440, 1448-50 (9th Cir. 1985) (one day); In re TexIon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092,
1094, 1098 (2d Cir. 1979) (none); Blumer, 66 Bankr. at 114 (none); In re Columbia Motor Express, 49 Bankr. 216, 217
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (none); In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 860-61 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (none);
In re Adamson Co., 29 Bankr. 937, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (one day); Sullivan Ford, 2 Bankr. at 357 (one day);
but see Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605 (one day, no relief); In re Public Leasing Corp., 344 F. Supp. 754, 755-56 (W.D.
Okla. 1972) (none, no relief). If two or more days notice is given, the courts invariably uphold the adequacy of the notice.
See, e.g., In re FCX, Inc., 54 Bankr. 833, 839 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1985) (four days); In re Sheehan, 38 Bankr. 859,
860-63 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984) (three days); In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364, 365 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983) (three days); Anderson-Walker, 3 Bankr. at 552 (up to two days).
Probably the leading recent case finding a financing order void as a violation of due process because of inadequate
timeliness and specificity is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d at 1448-50. Owens-Coming, a
lien creditor, was given only one day notice of a hearing on the debtor's motion requesting authority to use cash collateral
and to grant under 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1982) another lender a security interest in Owens-Coming's collateral senior to
that held by Owens-Coming (i.e., a priming lien). Although a fully noticed hearing was held a few weeks later, the
bankruptcy judge interpreted the initial order as final and not subject to modification. The Ninth Circuit held that
Owens-Coming had been deprived of due process. Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d at 1448-50. The court suggested strongly
that no constitutional problem would have existed if the order entered at the first hearing had been subject to modification
at the second hearing. Id. at 1449 n.21. The court also was influenced by the fact that Owens-Coming had a specific
property interest, its lien, which was being impaired. Id. at 1445-46. A general unsecured creditor asserting a more
general potential impairment resulting from a lender preference clause may not have been as successful. Finally, the notice
given did not clearly indicate that a priming lien was being sought. Id. at 1449.
Currently the Advisory Committee Note to rule 4001 details the matters to be contained in the motion. FED. R.
BAKRu. P. 4001 (Adv. Comm. Note 1987).
319. See supra notes 307 and 310-11 and accompanying text.
320. The main limitation imposed by the rule is that the court at the temporary emergency hearing only authorize
the obtaining of credit in the amount necessary to respond to the emergency. FED. R. BANri. P. 4001(c)(2) (1987). See
supra notes 306-07 and infra note 340 and accompanying text.
321. See supra subparts III.A. and III.C.
322. See supra Part IV.
323. See supra subpart Ill.C.
324. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). See supra notes 241 and 311-12 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
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does give the bankruptcy court considerable discretion to protect against notice
deficiencies.
The due process question was explored in the preceding subparts. With regard
to lender preference clauses, due process should only require that notice be given to
an adequate representative group of unsecured creditors. 326 The amount of notice
necessary causes courts more difficulty. The question is whether enough notice was
given so that the representative creditors had time to prepare properly for and appear
at the hearing. 327 The financing order generally is considered void, and thus subject
to attack either on appeal, since section 364(e) would be inapplicable, or under rule
60(b)(4), if no notice is given and the order entered at the initial hearing is accorded
finality. 328 Conversely, if the order entered at the initial hearing is not final, but
instead subject to modification at a later hearing on full notice, no due process
violation will be found.3 29 The problem cases arise when some minimal amount of
notice is given and the order entered is final. 330 In the context of lender preference
clauses, overnight notice should be sufficient to satisfy due process. The urgency
with which financing orders often are entered supports a lenient due process
interpretation. 331 This approach would be consistent with the proposed scheme
outlined below.
Even if the order is not void, the lender still runs the risk of being found to be
in bad faith under section 364(e) or of having the order vacated or modified under rule
60(b)(6). Initially, a distinction should be noted between section 364(e) and rule
60(b)(6), with the latter possibly permitting broader relief. Establishing bad faith on
the part of the lender for purposes of section 364(e) requires appealing unsecured
creditors to link the lender personally to the notice deficiency. Generally, responsi-
bility for giving notice of applications for financing orders rests with the debtor in
possession, and not with the lender. Under rule 60(b)(6), fault of the party benefiting
from the order is a sufficient but not a necessary basis for granting relief. 332 Instead,
detriment to the aggrieved party, here the unsecured creditors, would suffice. 333
Courts should not hesitate to make the linkage required under section 364(e) to
326. See supra notes 271-91 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 316 and 318-19 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
330. As suggested in note 318 supra, the vast majority of courts have been willing to grant relief when creditors were
not given at least two days notice of the application for the financing order. See, e.g., In re Center wholesale, 759 F.2d
1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985) (one day); In re Blumer, 66 Bankr. 109, 114 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (none); In re Garland,
6 Bankr. 456, 458 n.2 (Bankr. App. D. Mass. 1980) (none) (dictum); In re Columbia Motor Express, 49 Bankr. 216,
218-19 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (none); In re Monach Circuit Indus., 41 Bankr. 859, 860-61 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)
(none); In re Adamson Co., 29 Bankr. 937, 938-41 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (one day); In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2
Bankr. 350, 353-57 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (one day). In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir.
1987) (one day), and In re Public Leasing Corp., 344 F. Supp. 754, 755-56 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (none), stand out as the
principal exceptions.
331. The attorneys for the objecting unsecured creditors are likely to be familiar already with the types of legal issues
encountered at financing hearings, since those issues recur from case to case. See, e.g., In re Sheehan, 38 Bankr. 859,
861-62 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984). Factual development by the objecting creditors at the hearing usually is only in the form
of cross-examination of principals of the debtor and lender, and thus insufficient time to obtain and prepare direct evidence
probably would not change trial strategy in most cases.
332. See 11 C. Wpdotrr & A. Mu.LsR, supra note 215, § 2864, at 213.
333. See 7 MooRE, supra note 204, 60.24[5], at 60-216.
[Vol. 50:109
LENDER PREFERENCE CLAUSES
implicate a lender for notice deficiencies, since the lender in practice dictates if,
when, and on what terms the financing will be made. The debtor has little
independent say. 334 Beyond this distinction, this Article asserts that the bases for
giving relief based on inadequate notice should be the same whether raised under
section 364(e) or under rule 60(b)(6).
The critical question is what sort of notice deficiencies will be sufficient to
establish a basis for relief under section 364(e) or rule 60(b)(6). A leading bankruptcy
treatise considering the notice problem under section 364(e) states the view that bad
faith should not be imputed lightly in such cases, because of the fact that short notice
is indeed a fact of life in the financing context. 335 In addition, bankruptcy lending can
only be encouraged if lenders have some certainty in dealing with debtors in
possession. Having said that, however, lenders should not be absolved absolutely of
any possible notice deficiencies. The scheme suggested below will provide ample
certainty to lenders and yet protect the procedural needs of unsecured creditors.
My proposal is: (1) that the protection of the lender should be tied to compliance
with the notice provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules, and
especially with Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c), and (2) that a series of presumptions should
be applied depending on various factors, particularly the amount of notice given. In
all cases, notice to the appropriate representative group should suffice.
On the one hand, if no prior notice is given and the order entered is final, then
the lender will not be protected, because of the violations of due process, 336 Code
section 102(1),337 and rule 4001(c). 338 If, on the other hand, the fifteen days notice
required by rule 4001(c) is given, then the lender should conclusively be protected.
Furthermore, if the order entered at the initial emergency hearing is tentative only,
expressly subject to the bankruptcy court's final approval at the fifteen day hearing,
then again the lender's protection should be established conclusively, as long as at
least overnight notice was given of the initial hearing. 339 Thus, the lender can be
certain it will be protected against notice deficiency arguments if it insists that fifteen
days notice be given before entry of the final order, and overnight notice before entry
of a tentative order.
The difficult case, then, is the common one falling between the two extremes of
no notice and fifteen days notice, when prior notice is given, but a hearing is held and
a final authorization to obtain credit is granted before the fifteen-day period expires.
Rule 4001(c) in such a situation only allows the court to authorize that financing
needed to get the debtor through the emergency, i.e., to the fifteen-day
334. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. A lender concerned about being protected under § 364(e) would be
able to insist that the debtor give the minimal notice probably necessary to afford the lender protection. If the proposal
outlined below is adopted, the lender's certainty would be enhanced.
335. See 2 Coy.um ON BAznRtwrcy, supra note 49, 364.06, at 364-16.
336. See supra notes 311-12 and 328 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 270 and 309 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
339. As noted above, due process in such a case would not require prior notice of the initial hearing. See supra notes
310 and 329 and accompanying text. Rule 4001 (c)(3) appears to require prior notice even in the emergency case, see supra
note 308 and accompanying text, a requirement that I assert is wise. See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
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hearing. 34° Accordingly, the lender should not be protected for any amounts lent prior
to the fifteen-day hearing in excess of the debtor's needs for that period.
As to amounts lent for use during the fifteen-day period which are necessary to
the debtor in possession, a series of presumptions should be invoked to determine the
protection of the lender. If less than overnight notice is given, a strong presumption
against the adequacy of the notice should be raised. This presumption should be
rebuttable only upon proof of circumstances necessitating same-day notice by clear
and convincing evidence. A total failure of prior notice should never be allowed. If
at least overnight notice is given, the presumption should be reversed, now favoring
the adequacy of the notice. 34' Because the normal amount of notice dictated by rule
4001(c) is not being given, the presumption of adequate notice in such a situation
should be rebuttable by proof by only a preponderance of the evidence either (1) that
the notice given was insufficient to allow the objecting creditors to prepare
meaningfully for the hearing 42 or (2) that more notice could have been given with no
reasonable likelihood of risk to the reorganization. 343
With regard to this latter point, objecting unsecured creditors should be able to
deny the lender protection under section 364(e) and attack the order under rule
60(b)(6) by successfully arguing that the debtor and the lender were at fault,
"whether by design or neglect," 344 in creating the emergency. The allegation
typically would be that the debtor and lender knew of the need for financing and could
have acted upon that need345 at least fifteen days in advance, but delayed filing the
application for financing until right before the financing was needed, thus circum-
venting the full procedural protections to which the unsecured creditors are
entitled. 346 Such a practice must be strongly discouraged, lest it become habit-
340. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(2). See also Ordin, supra note 20, at 180.
341. Note that this presumption would change the result in the majority of one-day notice cases. See supra notes 318
and 330.
342. See, e.g., In re Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d 1440, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1985).
343. The circuit court in Ellingsen stated that the issue was not what notice could have been given, but whether the
notice given was adequate. In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 834 F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 1987). The Sullivan Ford court,
on the other hand, did consider the amount of notice that could have been given. In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350,
355 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980). Accord In re Adamson Co., 29 Bankr. 937, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984). The vision of the
Ellingsen court is too narrow. The whole lender protection issue turns on the reconciliation of a number of competing
policies, and the reconciliation effected may depend on the comparative strength or weakness of the underlying facts
supporting those policies. One of those policies is that interested parties be given adequate notice before their rights are
affected; another is that lenders be treated fairly. If lenders do not give as much notice as they easily could have, thereby
straining the adequacy of the notice to the very limits, little is gained by invoking an all-or-nothing approach as to the
adequacy of the notice viewed in isolation. The inequitable conduct of the lender which contributed to the notice problem
should be considered by the court in deciding whether the lender should be protected.
344. Sullivan Ford, 2 Bankr. at 354.
345. In many cases the debtor and lender will be aware of the need for financing well in advance of actually working
out the details of that financing. Indeed, the lender may be reluctant to finance at all. The time before the lender and debtor
have agreed in substance to the basic financing terms should not be counted against the lender for purposes of the delay
argument. The difficulty of monitoring the activities of the debtor and lender in this regard are obvious, but there really
is no alternative that would not be grossly unfair to the lender.
346. Such an argument was made by the creditors in Ellingsen, but so far has been rejected on appeal based on
insufficient proof. Ellingsen, 834 F.2d at 605; In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., 65 Bankr. 358, 363 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
In In re Stanley Hotel, 15 Bankr. 660, 665 (D. Colo. 1981), the trustee delayed several months in seeking financing after
knowing of the need for it, and the court, although upholding the notice given, suggested that the trustee's delay was
relevant to resolving the notice issue. In Sullivan Ford, 2 Bankr. at 354-55, the court in denying emergency financing
relief gave considerable weight to the fact that the application for financing had been delayed even after the need was
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forming for bankruptcy lenders. If no "at-fault delay" is established, then the
presumption should be in favor of upholding the adequacy of the notice given.
The remaining difficulty is whether the lender should be protected as to those
parts of the emergency order not dealing directly with the postpetition financing but
packaged as part of the order, such as lender preference clauses. The lender would
argue that it would not have lent even for the emergency period without the lender
preference clauses and that those clauses thus are absolutely necessary to the
emergency financing contemplated by rule 4001(C). 34 7 Because of the permanent and
potentially deleterious effect of lender preference clauses on the rights of unsecured
creditors, 348 and the tangential relation of those clauses to the postpetition
financing, 349 I propose that lenders should not be protected as to lender preference
clauses granted in a final order before the fifteen-day period expires. Instead, such
clauses should in all cases be authorized only tentatively at the initial hearing (again
after at least overnight notice), with that authorization subject to final approval at the
fifteen-day hearing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy long has operated under a cloud of suspicion and mystery in the eyes
of most of the legal profession, and certainly in the eyes of the public. This negative
image probably has contributed in part to the refusal of Congress to grant article III
status to bankruptcy judges. 350 Two components of this perception are that bank-
ruptcy cases are governed by arcane and incomprehensible procedures and that the
substantive rights of parties may be disregarded with impunity in bankruptcy. In
recent years affirmative steps have been taken to eliminate whatever truth there may
be in those two perceptions and to upgrade the standing and status of bankruptcy. The
Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 1973, using a
basic premise of equating bankruptcy procedure to civil procedure generally. 35' The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978352 sought to make substantive bankruptcy law fairer,
simpler, and more cohesive.
Despite these efforts, however, bankruptcy cases in general and Chapter 11 cases
in particular continue to suffer from poor press. The view persists that reorganization
proceedings are unfair and arbitrary. Unfortunately, there is much truth in this
known. The court noted that the party seeking relief is in a position to manipulate the timing and that such manipulations
may prejudice other interested parties, thereby requiring the court to assume the role of watchdog to protect the rights of
the affected parties. The court was concerned about the possibility of intentionally delayed applications becoming a habit
for debtors and lenders. Id. at 355. Accord Adamson, 29 Bankr. at 941.
347. See In re Adams Apple, 829 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
348. See supra notes 6 and 8 and accompanying text. For example, a clause waiving attacks on a prepetition
collateral position precludes any future challenge to the validity of that security.
349. See supra notes 61-62 and 76 and accompanying text.
350. See generally Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial
Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEolS. 1 (1985) (discussing the behind-the-scenes maneuvering
leading up to the passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (1978)).
351. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
352. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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observation. Recent developments involving the utilization of lender preference
clauses in Chapter 11 cases, discussed in this Article, only serve to bring further
disrepute to the beleaguered institution that is Chapter 11. Lenders have been able to
take advantage of emergency situations to extract preferential treatment for their
prepetition claims, thereby gaining an advantage over other unsecured creditors.
Those preferential benefits in many cases have been shielded from even the
possibility of appellate review because of the improper application of Code section
364(e) and other doctrines limiting appealability.
Conversely, if the financing order has become final and the time for filing an
appeal has expired, courts must be willing to hold that the game is over with regard
to the challenged provisions in the particular case, unless some extreme notice
deficiency or fraud is proven. Freely allowing out-of-time revisions of final orders,
as a number of courts have done, will only inspire further belief in the "kangaroo
court" nature of bankruptcy cases.
Finally, some certainty is needed in reconciling the need to act quickly in
emergency situations and the need to protect the rights of interested creditors to
receive notice and be heard. This Article has outlined a proposed method for
analyzing notice issues in Chapter 11 cases.
Bankruptcy cases today operate much more in the light of day than in the past.
The loose procedures and rough "justice" common in earlier days no longer are
appropriate. Tightening up the application of rules regarding appealability, finality,
and notice in the financing order context would constitute an important step in the
right direction.
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